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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to U.C. A. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e), inasmuch as it is an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case, not 
involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does the State lack jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendant? Jurisdiction is a 
question of law, subject to a correction of error standard, and according no particular 
deference to the trial court. Skokos v. Corradini. 900 P.2d 539,541 (Utah App. 1995); 
State v. Gomez. 63 P.3d 72 (Utah 2002). This issue was briefed extensively in the trial 
court (14-35; 86-97; 98-109; 122-128; 150-168; 198-212; 226-251; 340-341; 351-352; 
Atkins 16-38; Thunehorst 19-40) and was the subject of numerous hearings (579; 580; 
581), and rulings 260-265; 327-318(?); 359-364. 
INCLUDED ISSUES. All of the issues set forth below pertain to the question of 
jurisdiction. As sub-issues of the issue of jurisdiction, all of the issues present questions 
of law, subject to the standard of appellate review set forth above. 
a. Is the court bound by federal law? 27-28; 41-42; Atkins 29-30; Thunehorst 32-
33; 579, pp. 6-10; 580, p. 40; 584, pp. 13,20. 
b. Is federal jurisdiction over Indian lands exclusive? 19-20, Atkins 21-22; 
Thunehorst 24-25; 580, p. 5. 
i. Did the alleged offenses take place in Indian country? 25; 87-88; 99-100; 
226-228; Atkins 27; Thunehorst 31; 584, pp. 164, 174-175. 
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ii. Was the victim of the alleged offenses an Indian tribe? 210-211; 235; 
264; 580, p. 38, 581, pp. 18, 22-23. 
c. Does the State have jurisdiction over the conduct in question? 20-23; 89-90; 
101-102; 164-167; Atkins 22-25; Thunehorst 25-29; 581, p. 30. 
i. Are hunting and fishing rights of Indian sovereignty? 23-24; Atkins 25-
26; Thunehorst 29-30. 
ii. Can hunting and fishing rights be exercised without enrollment in a 
federally recognized tribe? 90-92; 102-104; 126-128; 262; 579, pp. 5,27. 
iii. Does the Uintah Band possess vested treaty rights? 163; 229-231; 298; 
361; 580, pp. 11, 13-14; 581, p. 32. 
iv. Is the Uintah Band a separate and independent entity? 232-233; 235; 
298-299; 357; 359-360; 578, p. 5; 580, pp. 12-13; 583, p. 3. 
v. Do Indian tribes determine their own membership criteria? 125-126; 161-
163; 226-228; 261; 281; 361; 579, p. 27; 581, pp. 8, 29, 33. 
d. Does the Ute Partition Act have any effect on vested treaty rights? 163-164; 
198; 580, p. 45; 581, pp. 30-31. 
i. Is the effect of the UPA limited to federal benefits? 198-199. 
ii. Are indivisible assets exempted from the operation of the UPA? 199-201. 
iii. Are hunting and fishing rights an indivisible asset? 201-204. 
iv. Does the UPA confer any jurisdiction upon the State over hunting and 
fishing on Indian lands? 204-207. 
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v. Can termination be imputed to persons not included on the termination 
roll? 207-209; 228; 361-362; Atkins 164; Thunehorst 163; 580, pp. 3-4; 581, p.32. 
vi. Does the UPA have any effect on the separate assets of the Uintah 
Band? 158; 209-210. 
vii. Does the trial court have jurisdiction to interpret the UPA? 32-33; 34-
35; 361; 581, p. 31. 
viii. Is the UPA constitutional? 154-157; 281-282. 
a. Does the UPA violate the Equal Protection clause of the XTV4 
Amendment? 281-282. 
b. Is the UPA a covert attempt to eliminate all Indian rights in the 
Uintah Basin? 155-157; 229; 237-251; 580, p. 7. 
2. Did the Court deny Defendant due process of law by excluding evidence of 
reasonable reliance upon a published court ruling? Reasonable reliance is a question of 
statutory interpretation, subject to a correction of error standard, and according no 
particular deference to the trial court. State v. Bluff. 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002), cert, 
denied 537 U.S. 1172, 123 S.Ct. 999,154 L.Ed.2d 914. This issue was briefed (335-345; 
346-356; Atkins 73-107; Thunehorst 74-109) prior to trial and the subject of specific 
rulings (319-323; Atkins 162-165; Thunehorst 161-164). 
INCLUDED ISSUES. All of the issues set forth below pertain to the question of 
reasonable reliance. As sub-issues of the issue of reasonable reliance, all of the issues 
present questions of law, subject to the standard of appellate review set forth above. 
4 
a. Were the Defendants denied due process in the jurisdiction proceedings? 18; 
Atkins 20; Thunehorst 23. 
i. Was the burden of proof improperly shifted to the Defendants? 263; 579, 
pp. 2, 25; 580, pp. 31-39; 581, p. 14. 
ii. Were the Defendants improperly prohibited from presenting evidence of 
their Indian status? 579, p. 2, 580, pp. 14, 30, 42-43,45; 581, p. 12. 
iii. Did the State fail to rebut the Defendants' prima facie case? 89-90; 101-
102; 579, pp. 11, 17, 20, 25; 580, pp. 4-5. 
iv. Is individual Indian status determined by tribal status? 125-126; 161-
163; 261; 282; 361; 579, pp. 12, 27; 580, pp. 17-18; 581, pp. 6-7, 9, 26-27,29, 33. 
b. Were the Defendants entitled to present evidence as to Mistake of Law under 
U.C.A. §76-2-304? 321; 323; 335-340; 346-351; Atkins 92-97; 163; Thunehorst 94-99; 
162; 579, p. 22; 582, p. 4; 584, pp. 192-195. 
i. Did prohibiting the presentation of evidence prejudice the Defendants? 
122-125; 305-309; 342-344; 353-355; Atkins 73-92; Thunehorst 74-93; 580, p. 6. 
ii. Is reasonableness a question of fact for the jury? 168-169; 171-173; 321; 
322; 337, 339-340; 341; 348; 350-351; 352; Atkins 94; 96; 163; Thunehorst 95; 
98; 162; 583, p. 5; 584, p. 28. 
iii. Were the Defendants entitled to jury instructions as to reasonable 
reliance and Mistake of Law? 584, pp. 26-28; 180; 182-187. 
3. Were the Defendants prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge. The 
5 
sufficiency of an affidavit alleging bias is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
State in re: MX.. 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998). 276-292; 294-295; 578, pp. 3, 4, 
5; 580, p. 23; 581, p. 44; 584, pp. 73, 109-121, 125-126,150. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article VI, Section 2, United States Constitution 
Vth Amendment, United States Constitution 
XIVth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article I, Section 3, Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution 
Article III, Section 2, Utah Constitution 
25 U.S.C. §677-677aa 
25U.S.C. §1321 
25 U.S.C. §1324 
25 U.S.C. §1326 
Act of May 5, 1864, ch. LXXVH, 13 Stat. 64 
Act of May 24,1888, ch. 310,25 Stat. 157 
Act of June 4,1898, ch. 376, 30 Stat. 429 
Act of May 27,1902, ch. 888,32 Stat 263 
Joint Resolution of June 19,1902, Resolution No. 31,32 Stat. 744 
Act of March 3,1903, ch. 994,32 Stat. 997 
Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069 
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Act of June 28, 1910, ch. 140, §23, 36 Stat 284 
Section 8-1-3(1), Ute Law and Order Code 
U.CA. §76-2*304. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendants are Shoshone Indians native to Utah who were on Indian land. 
They are charged with hunting on non-Indian land without State permits. 
On October 27, 2002, Defendant Rick Reber was cited by a Utah Fish and 
Wildlife officer for Aiding or Assisting in the Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife,, 
in violation of U.CA. §§23-20-4 and 23-20-23. His son, Colton Reber, who was 13 at the 
time, was likewise cited for violating U.CA §23-20-4. The underlying allegation was 
that Colton had shot a trophy buck in the Book Cliffs in Uintah County without a valid 
state permit. Both were charged with a third degree felony. The Book Cliffs are within 
the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation. 
On November 17, 2002, Defendant Tex Atkins was cited by a Utah Fish and 
Wildlife officer for Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, in violation of U.CA. 
§23-20-4. Defendant Steve Thunehorst was charged in the same incident with Aiding or 
Assisting in the Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, in violation of U.CA. §§23-
20-4 and 23-20-23. Both were charged with class A Misdemeanors. The underlying 
allegation was that Mr. Atkins had shot a spiked buck in Whiterocks Canyon in Uintah 
County, and that Mr. Thunehorst had assisted him. Whiterocks Canyon is within the 
external boundaries of the Uinta Valley Reservation. 
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An information was filed against Mr. Reber in the Eighth District Court on 
October 31, 2002. A petition was filed against Colton Reber in the First District Juvenile 
Court on December 23, 2002. Informations were filed against Mr. Atkins and Mr. 
Thunehorst in the Eighth District Court on December 12,2002, 
Mr. Reber made his initial appearance on December 2,2002. On December 30, 
2002, Mr, Reber filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. The matter was 
exhaustively briefed, and hearings were held on February 26,2003, June 3,2003, 
September 9,2003, and October 21,2003. The court ultimately denied the Motion to 
Dismiss. On November 5,2003, Mr. Reber filed a motion to disqualify Judge Payne 
based on manifest bias and prejudice. This motion was denied by the presiding judge, 
Hon. John Anderson, on November 10, 2003. On December 8, 2003, Mr. Reber filed a 
list of proposed witnesses as to the defense of reasonable reliance, to which the State 
objected on December 19,2003, and the matter was briefed. At a hearing on January 27, 
2004, the trial court sustained the State's objections and excluded all evidence for the 
defense. 
Trial was held before a jury on March 18, 2004. Jurors with manifest bias against 
the Defendant were only excluded from the jury pool after strenuous objection by Mr. 
Reber against vehement opposition by the trial judge. At trial Mr, Reber again attempted 
to introduce evidence of his own Indian status and that the location of the alleged offense 
is Indian country. The court excluded all such evidence, and the jury returned with a 
guilty verdict in less than 7 minutes. 
s 
On May 4,2004, Mr. Reber was sentenced to 3 years probation, fined $1,250.00, 
and ordered to pay $4,000.00 to the Utah Department of Wildlife Resources "stop 
poaching fund" The court ordered that the fine and restitution be held by the court 
pending the outcome of all appeals. This appeal was filed the same day, 
Mr. Atkins and Mr. Thunehorst made their initial appearance before the court on 
January 13,2003. On February 26, 2003, the State and the Defendants stipulated that die 
court's rulings as to jurisdiction on the Reber matter would apply equally to Mr. Atkins 
and Mr. Thunehorst. This agreement was incorporated into a stipulated order on 
November 5,2003. On March 15, 2004, the State and the Defendants filed a stipulation 
that the motions, memoranda, rulings, and orders pertaining to jurisdiction in the Reber 
case be certified into and become a part of the record in the Atkins and Thunehorst cases. 
On March 1, 2004, Mr. Atkins and Mr. Thunehorst filed a Motion in Limine 
proposing witnesses and testimony as to their status as Indians and the status of 
Whiterocks Canyon as Indian country. On May 24,2004, the court denied the 
Defendants' Motion in Limine, ruling as in the Reber case that the Defendants could 
present no defense. 
On June 1,2004, Mr, Atkins and Mr. Thunehorst entered conditional pleas to 
reduced charges of Attempted Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, a class B 
misdemeanor, reserving the right to appeal all issues. Both Defendants were ordered to 
pay a $500.00 fine and $200.00 restitution to the Department of Wildlife Resources. As 
in the Reber case, the court ordered that the fine and restitution be held by the court 
9 
pending the outcome of all appeals. The Appeals were filed on the same day. However, a 
formal Judgment and Order was not filed in the Atkins and Thunehorst cases until July 
30,2004. The Notices of Appeal were refiled on August 2, 2004, resulting in duplicate 
case numbers. By order of the Court of Appeals on August 20,2004, the Atkins and 
Thunehorst appeals were consolidated with the Reber appeal, case no. 20040371-CA. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
L Prior to the arrival of white settlers in Utah, the territory was inhabited by 
Shoshone Indians. 122 
2. On October 3, 1861, the Uinta Valley was set aside as an Indian reservation by 
executive order of President Abraham Lincoln. Congress confirmed this Order on May 5, 
1864, stating that the Uinta Valley was "set apart for the permanent settlement and 
exclusive occupation of such of the different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory as 
may be induced to inhabit the same." 123 
3. The Defendants, Rickie Reber, Tex Atkins, and Steve Thunehorst, are Indians 
of Utah Territory whose rights were reserved under the 1861 Order and the 1864 Act 
122; Atkins 73; Thunehorst 74. 
4. The Defendants' ancestors who were covered by the 1861 Order and the 1864 
Act were Shoshone, not Ute. They spoke the Shoshone language, not the Ute language. 
Their customs are those of the Shoshone people of Utah, Idaho, Nevada, and Wyoming. 
Their customs are not those of the Utes of Colorado. 150 
5. After the Uinta Valley was set aside as an Indian reservation, the Department of 
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the Interior set up the Uinta Agency to manage the affairs of the Uinta Valley Reserve. 
Those Indians who were located in the Uinta Valley and came under the jurisdiction of 
the Uinta Agency became known as the "Uintah Band." 151 
6. During the 1860's and 1870's, many of the Indians of Utah Territory who were 
not already in the Uinta Valley relocated to the Uinta Agency. Such Indians were 
thereafter referred to as the "Uintah Band/' 151 
7. The term "Uintah Band" merely identified the agency having jurisdiction over 
the Indians. It had no bearing on the Indians' identity as Shoshone, nor on their rights as 
Indians of Utah Territory. No Treaty or Act of Congress has transferred, modified, 
abrogated, or terminated any rights reserved to those Indians under the 1861 Order or the 
Act of 1864, nor have those Indians surrendered any of those rights. 151 
8. In 1881, the White River Band and the Uncompahgre Utes were brought to Utah 
under military escort from Colorado, having been previously divested of all lands within 
the continental United States. The Uintah Band, the White River Band, and the 
Uncompahgre Utes continue to maintain their separate identities to the present day. These 
separate identities have been recognized by numerous acts of Congress. 152 
9. All Indian rights in the Uinta Valley under the 1861 Order and the 1864 Act are 
those of the Uintah Band, inasmuch as neither the Whiterivers nor the Uncompahgres 
inhabited the reservation in 1861, nor are they "Indians of said [Utah] territory," as set 
forth in the Act of May 5, 1864. 232 
10. In 1937 the three bands of Indians inhabiting the reservation adopted a 
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constitution as the "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation." Nothing in 
the constitution surrendered any rights or assets possessed by any one band to either of 
the other two, nor diminished or abrogated any of the rights possessed by any of the 
separate bands. 152 
U. From 1953 until 1966 Congress engaged in a policy of "terminating" federal 
supervision over select Indian tribes. The policy has since been entirely discredited and 
repeatedly renounced by Congress and several presidents, beginning with President 
Richard Nixon in a Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs. Pub. Papers 564 
(Richard M. Nixon, July 8^  1970). Termination applied only to federal benefits. It had no 
effect on tribal identity, nor on vested treaty rights, such as hunting and fishing. 154 
12. On August 27, 1954, Congress passed the "Ute Partition Act" (68 Stat. 877). 
The UPA denominated the majority of the Uintah Band as "mixed-bloods" and termi-
nated their status as Ute Indians. Since that time, the Uintah Band has continued its tribal 
identity without federal supervision. A token portion of the Uintah Band remains under 
the control of the Ute Tribe. However, the Uintah Band is not ethnically Ute. In effect, 
the Uintah Band was only under the control of the Ute Tribe from 1937 to 1954. 154-155 
13. No other tribe in the United States, either before or since, has ever been 
divided by Congress as between "mixed-bloods" and "full-bloods." 154 
14. Under the 1954 Act, a roll of 490 so-called "mixed-bloods" was compiled. 456 
of the 490 were the Uintah Band. The term "mixed-blood" is profoundly derogatory, as 
has been recognized by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. U.S. v. Von Murdock 132 F.3d 
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534, 535, n.l (10th Cir. 1997). Pursuant to the Act, federal supervision over the 490 was 
terminated. 154 
15. Rick Reber was born in 1952 prior to enactment of the 1954 Act. Mr. 
Thunehorst's mother, Leanna Chivers Thunehorst, was likewise born prior to the 1954 
Act. Neither was included on the "termination" roll Nor was Mr. Atkin's mother. 153; 
298; 581, pp. 10,28. 
16. On July 16,1958, the Ute Tribal Business Committee passed Resolution 58-
163, which states in pertinent part (161; 205; 307; 421; 504): 
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE UINTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL 
BUSINESS COMMITTEE That the fish and game upon all lands to be 
received by the Mixed-Blood group pursuant to the agreed division, as 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall, from the date hereof, be 
under the management and control of the Mixed-Blood group exclusively 
and said Mixed-Blood group, should they so desire, may sell hunting and 
fishing permits or licenses and retain all funds derived therefrom without 
accounting to the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
17. Mr. Reber, Mr. Atkins, and Mr. Thunehorst are Indians of Utah Territory 
associated with the Uintah Band. They are recognized as such by the Uintah Band. They 
are descendants of Wansitz, an Indian of Utah Territory. The name Wansitz is Shoshone 
for "Antelope." Wansitz was not a Ute, 153; Atkins 73; Thunehorst 74. 
18. Membership in the Uintah Band requires blood kinship. There are no members 
of the Uintah Band who do not have ancestry from Indians of Utah Territory. This is the 
established custom of the tribe, and therefore the Uintah Band has never set a specific 
minimum blood quantum as a criterion for membership, and Congress has never imposed 
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such a quantum on the Uintah Band. 153-156; Atkins 82; Thunehorst 83. 
19. In 1997, the Kf1 Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Indian country consisted 
of all lands within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian reservations 
except for those lands withdrawn under the 1902-1905 homestead and townsite laws. Ute 
Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Utah. 114F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997). 25; 
87-88; 99-100; 227 
20. The location where Mr. Reber was in the Book Cliffs and the location where 
Mr. Atkins and Mr. Thunehorst were charged with hunting in Whiterocks Canyon are 
both within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray reservations. Neither 
location has ever constituted a homestead or townsite under the 1902-1905 acts. 504, #4 
21. In 2002, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed that Indians of Utah 
Territory covered by the Act of May 5, 1864, are entitled to hunt on Indian lands without 
state interference. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conwav. 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002). 24; 94; 
106; 160 
22. At the time of the alleged offenses, Mr. Reber, Mr. Atkins, and Mr. 
Thunehorst were acting in reliance on the 10th Circuit's rulings in Ute Tribe v. Utah and 
Conwav. 342; 353; Atkins 74; Thunehorst 75. 
23. Notwithstanding the 10* Circuit's rulings in Ute Tribe v. Utah and Conway. 
the trial court that held that it was not bound by either federal ruling, even though the 
State of Utah was a party to both actions. The trial court held that it had jurisdiction over 
the Defendants. 579, pp. 6-10; 580, pp. 40,41-42; 584, pp. 13,20; 363. 
14 
24. When the bias of the trial judge became apparent, and based on prior dealings 
between Judge Lynn Payne and members of the Uintah Band, Mr. Reber moved for the 
judge to be disqualified. This motion was denied by the presiding judge. 276-295 
25. All three Defendants then moved to present evidence that their reliance upon 
the rulings of the 10th Circuit was reasonable. The proffered evidence included testimony 
by the county recorder that the locations in question are within the territory defined in 
Ute Tribe v. Utah, and extensive evidence that the Defendants are in fact Indians of Utah 
Territory as defined in Conwav. 305-309; 335-356; 504; 584, pp. 10, 16-18,20-23; 
Atidns 73-107; 156-159; Thunehorst 74-109; 151-158. 
26. The trial court prohibited the Defendants from presenting any evidence as to 
reasonable reliance, holding that their reliance was unreasonable as a matter of law. 319-
323; Atkins 162-165; Thunehorst 161-164. 
27. Trial on Rick Reber was held on March 18, 2004. The bias of the trial judge 
was again manifested in the selection of jurors. 584; 584, pp. 73, 109-121, 125-126,150 
28. The jury was never pennitted to hear that Mr. Reber was On Indian land, that 
he was an Indian, or that he had reason to believe he could rely on federal rulings that 
defined that Indian status. The jury returned a guilty verdict in under 7 minutes. 584, pp. 
168-169, 171-175,182-187,192-195. 
29. On June 1,2004, Defendants Tex Atkins and Steve Thunehorst entered pleas 
of No Contest to reduced charges on condition that all issues be reserved for appeal. 
Atkins 168-170; 180-182; Thunehorst 167-169; 179-181. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The State has no jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendants. The Defendants are 
Indians who were exercising federally protected rights on Indian land. The State of Utah 
has no jurisdiction over the conduct, nor over the territory in question. 
A. The court is obligated to follow federal law. Indian rights are determined by 
federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law is binding upon the states in 
general, and state court judges in particular. 
B. Federal jurisdiction over Indian lands is exclusive. By federal statute, as well as 
caselaw, federal jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on Indian lands, including offenses 
by supposed non-Indians, is exclusive. Indeed, the federal statute for prosecuting non-
Indians for hunting on Indian lands was enacted for the explicit reason that the states lack 
jurisdiction to do so. 
1. The alleged offenses took place in Indian country. In accordance with the most 
recent, binding rulings of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as federal statute, both 
Whiterocks Canyon and the Book Cliffs in Uintah County constitute "Indian country." 
2. The State has no jurisdiction if the victim of the alleged offense is an Indian 
tribe- The wildlife in Indian country belongs to the Indians. The Ute tribe has asserted 
this ownership by specific enactment. Accordingly, only Indians could be victims of the 
alleged offenses. Under the rulings of this Court, the State of Utah lacks jurisdiction if the 
victim of an offense is an Indian in Indian country. 
C. The State has no jurisdiction over the conduct in question. States can only 
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obtain jurisdiction over Indian lands by complying with specific steps defined by federal 
statute, amending their state constitutions accordingly, and receiving the consent of the 
affected tribe. None of these steps have been taken, and even if they had been, hunting 
and fishing rights would still be exempt, 
L Hunting and fishing are sovereign rights predating the existence of the United 
States. Hunting and fishing rights are not privileges or benefits. They are rights of 
sovereignty which Indian tribes have possessed since time immemorial. As such, they 
cannot be extinguished absent a treaty or act of Congress that is explicit as to its intent. 
No such treaty or act has ever been enacted with regard to the Indians of Utah Territory. 
2. Hunting and fishing rights do not require enrollment in a federally recognized 
tribe. "Federal recognition" consists of inclusion on the Secretary of the Interior's list of 
tribes that qualify for federal benefits. Federal recognition pertains only to those benefits 
which are created by Congress. Inasmuch as hunting and fishing are sovereign rights 
predating Congress, federal recognition has no bearing on their exercise. 
3. The Uintah Band possesses vested treaty rights. The "Uintah Band" consists of 
Indians of Utah Territory who came within the jurisdiction of the onetime Uinta Agency. 
Their sovereign rights were reserved to them under the Executive Order of October 3, 
1861, and the Act of Congress of May 5,1864. They are the only Indians in the Uintah 
Basin who have claim upon these rights. These rights have been recognized by numerous 
acts of Congress. 
4. The Uintah Band is a separate and independent entity from the Ute Tribe. It 
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existed prior the creation of the Ute Tribe in 1937, and has existed independently of the 
Ute Tribe since 1954. It received no rights from the Ute Tribe, and has conferred none 
upon it. As such, the actions of the Ute Tribe have no bearing upon the rights of the 
Defendants. 
5. Indian tribes determine their own membership criteria. It is for Indian tribes, and 
Indian tribes alone, to determine who is and who is not a member of their tribe. Blood 
quantum is only one of many factors. If an Indian tribe acknowledges a person as a 
member, the sole question for a state court is not that person's blood quantum, but 
whether that tribe is legitimate. If so, all further inquiry by the state court must cease. 
D. The Ute Partion Act had no effect on vested treaty rights. The trial court relied 
upon the Ute Partition Act of August 27, 1954 (68 Stat 877; 25 U.S.C. §677-677aa) in 
detennining that the Defendants are not Indians and have no right to hunt or fish. In fact, 
the UPA has no relevance to hunting and fishing rights. 
1. By its own terms, the effect of the UPA is limited to federal benefits. The UPA 
makes no mention of vested treaty rights, such as hunting and fishing. The federal courts 
which have addressed this federal law have so stated explicitly. 
2. The UPA specifically exempts indivisible assets from its operation. Under the 
UPA, certain assets were divided between the Utes and those who had been expelled 
from the Ute Tribe. Those assets that were susceptible to equitable and practicable 
distribution remained the common property of all the Indians. 
3. Hunting and fishing rights are an indivisible asset. The federal courts have 
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repeatedly held that hunting and fishing rights are among those assets that are not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution. This is acknowledged by the United 
States Solicitor. 
4. The UPA confers no jurisdiction on the State over hunting and fishing rights on 
Indian lands. Tribal assets not otherwise distributed under the UPA remain under 
exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction. Hunting and fishing are one of those retained 
assets. The Ute Tribe itself has acknowledged as much. 
5. Termination cannot be imputed to persons not included on die termination roll. 
Mr. Reber and Mr. Thunehorsf s mother were bom as full-blooded Indians prior to the 
UPA. Neither their names nor the name of Mr. Atkins' mother were ever included on the 
list of Indians terminated. Any law presuming to abrogate Indian rights must be strictly 
construed. There is no provision in the UPA for tenninating persons other than those on 
the termination roll. 
6. The UPA has no effect on the separate assets of the Uintah Band. The UPA 
only affected the assets of the Ute Tribe. It makes no mention of the Uintah Band, and 
thus has no affect on those assets. The hunting rights of the Defendants are those of the 
Uintah Band, not of the Ute Tribe, 
7. The trial court has no jurisdiction to interpret the UPA. Only the federal courts 
have jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the UPA. Not even tribal courts are airthorized, 
and certainly not state courts. 
8- The UPA is unconstitutional. The explicit basis of the UPA, blood quantum, 
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violates the XIVth Amendment. Its implicit basis, elimination of the Uintah Band, is void, 
inasmuch as any act attempting to deprive Indians of reserved sovereign rights must be 
explicit as to its intent. 
a. The UPA violates the Equal Protection clause of the XIVth Amendment. The 
UPA is the only termination act ever enacted that presumes to divide a tribe along racial 
lines. It thus crosses the line from legislating over an Indian tribe as apolitical entity and 
instead deprives a people of their rights based solely on race. 
b. The UPA is a covert attempt to eliminate all Indian rights in the Uintah Basin. 
Without mentioning the tribe by name, the UPA was nevertheless undertaken as a means 
of destroying the Uintah Band. Its presumptions are manifest in its execution. 
II. Defendants were denied due process of law. The trial court reversed the burden 
of proof as to jurisdiction and placed it upon the Defendants, refused to let the 
Defendants present that proof, then proceeded to determine Indian status without first 
determining tribal status. At trial, the court prohibited the Defendants from presenting 
proof of a statutory affirmative defense. The entire proceedings were tainted by manifest 
bias on the part of the trial judge. 
A. The Defendants were denied due process in the jurisdiction proceedings. 
Subject matter jurisdiction must be determined by the court prior to trial. The State 
carries the burden to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence. 
1. The burden of proof was improperly shifted to the Defendants. The trial court 
erroneously, and explicitly, held that the Defendants must prove their Indian status. The 
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court relied on mi unpublished opinion to justify its actions. 
2. The Defendants were improperly prohibited from presenting evidence of their 
Indian status. After the court reversed the burden of proof, it then prohibited the 
Defendants from presenting that proof, but rather queried the Defendants as to facts 
which would support the court's predetermined theory of jurisdiction. 
3. The State failed to rebut the Defendants' prima facie case. To the extent 
possible, the Defendants made allegations that would establish prima facie their Indian 
status. The State presented no evidence whatsoever to reftrte these allegations. The court 
found jurisdiction nonetheless. 
4. Tribal status determines individual Indian status. The trial court could not 
determine individual Indian status without first determining whether the Defendants were 
recognized as Indians by a tribe. Instead, the court usurped the tribe's function and relied 
on selective criteria of the court's own choosing. Without the benefit of evidence, the 
court found implicitly that the tribe didn't exist. 
B. The Defendants were entitled to present evidence as to Mistake of Law under 
U.C.A. §76-2-304, A person cannot be convicted of a crime if they acted in reasonable 
reliance upon a published statement of the law. The Defendants acted in reliance upon a 
plethora of federal rulings, Ute tribal enactments, and statements by federal agencies. 
They were entitled to let a jury determine whether this reliance was reasonable. 
1. Prohibiting the presentation of evidence prejudiced the Defendants. The 
Defendants attempted to introduce detailed and competent evidence that they were 
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reasonable in believing they were on Indian land, and that they were reasonable in 
believing that they are in fact Indians of Utah Territory. With this evidence excluded, 
they were left with no defense whatsoever. 
2. Reasonableness and intent are questions of fact. Questions of fact are for the 
jury. By finding the Defendants conduct unreasonable as a matter of law, the trial court 
usurped the jury's function. 
3. Defendants were entitled to jury instructions as to reasonable reliance and 
Mistake of Law. Mr. Reber prepared detailed jury instructions embodying the tenns of 
U.C.A. §76-2-304(b) and related statutes. Those instructions would have been consistent 
with the evidence he attempted to introduce. In practice, only one defense witness got to 
testify, and only out of the hearing of the jury. Both the witness and the instructions 
should have been presented to the jury. 
C. The Defendants were prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge. The 
Uintah people have long experience of dealing with Judge Payne. His manifest bias 
against the Indians of Utah Territory tainted all of the proceedings, rendering a fair trial 
impossible. 
ARGUMENT 
L The State lacks jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendant 
The law is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, 
by either party or by the Court- State v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927,930 (Utah 1992). Further, 
'"when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can do 
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anything to fill the void." Curtis v. Curtis. 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990)(Intemal 
citation omitted). Without subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has no power to hear the 
controversy, and the case must be dismissed. See Conway* 286 F.3d at 1201 (Jurisdiction 
is a threshold question that appellate court must resolve before addressing mmts.)(citing 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct 1003, 140 
L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). 
A, The court is obligated to follow federal law. 
Throughout the proceedings in the trial court, the trial judge maintained that he 
was not bound by federal law. 578, p. 4; 579, pp. 6-10; 580, pp. 40,41-42; 584, pp. 13, 
20. On February 26,2003, this resulted in a remarkable colloquy in which Judge Payne 
maintained that he is not bound to follow federal rulings, even when the State of Utah is a 
party to those rulings. 579, pp. 8-9. Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Federal Indian law consists of Treaties made under the Authority of the United 
States and Laws made in Pursuance of the Constitution. Accordingly, the State of Utah 
and its judges are specifically bound by the rulings of federal courts in cases to which the 
State or its officers are parties. As cited jbefore the trial court, these included State v. 
HageiL 802 P.2d 745 (Utah App. 1990), reversed on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 
1993), a/fttHagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S.Ct. 958,127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994); Ute 
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Tribe v. Utah, supra, and Conway* supra. 
Article III, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that. . . Indian 
lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
Congress of the United States. 
Article II, Section 26, of the Utah Constitution states, "The provisions of this 
Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to 
be otherwise." Article I, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution states, "The State of Utah is 
an inseparable part of the Federal Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land." The trial court could only find State jurisdiction by ignoring 
the relevant federal statutes and rulings, which is was bound by Utah law to uphold. 
Upon this fundamental error, most other errors of the trial court were compiled. 
B. Federal jurisdiction over Indian lands is exclusive, 
"Indian country is subject to exclusive federal or tribal criminal jurisdiction 
'[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law." 18 U.S.C. §1152." Ross v. Neff. 905 
F.2d 1349, 1352 (10* Cir. 1990). State jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian 
countty is limited to criminal acts committed "by non-Indians against non-Indians... and 
victimless crimes by non-Indians," Solem v. Bartlett 465 U.S. 463,465 n.2, 104 S.Ct. 
1161, 79 L.E&2d 443 (1984). Indian interests implicate federal responsibility. The State 
thus can only exercise criminal jurisdiction when Indian interests are absent. See State v. 
Sorkhabi 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. App. 2002). "[T]he protection that federal law, 
treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is 'exclusively the province of federal 
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law.'" Conway. 286 F.3d at 1203, citing Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653, 
670-671, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979), quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. 
County of Oneida. 414 U.S. 661, 670,94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974). State officials 
who interfere with such protection are in violation of federal law. ANR Pipeline Co. v. 
Lafaver. 150F.2d 1178,1193 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Federal jurisdiction is specifically exclusive when the alleged offense is a hunting 
or fishing violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 provides: 
Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully and 
knowingly goes upon any land that belongs to any Indian or Indian tribe, 
band, or group and either are held by the United States in trust or are 
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States, or 
upon any lands of the United States that are reserved for Indian use, for the 
purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the removal of game, 
peltries, or fish therefrom, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than ninety days, or both, and all game, fish, and peltries in his 
possession shall be forfeited. 
This federal statute was passed for the specific reason that states have no 
jurisdiction to prosecute hunting or fishing offenses committed in Indian country and 
tribal courts are prohibited from exercising criminal jurisdiction over "non-Indians" for 
offenses committed in Indian country. Montana v. United States. 450 U.S. 544, 563,101 
S.Ct. 1245,1257,67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). "House Report No. 2593 stated that the 
purpose of the bill that became 18 U.S.C. § 1165 was to make it unlawful to enter Indian 
land to hunt, trap, or fish without the consent of the individual Indian or tribe." Montana. 
450 U.S. at 562,101 S.Ct at 1256. 18 U.S.C. §1165 "fills a gap in the present law for the 
protection of their property." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 435 U.S. 191,206,98 
25 
S.Ct 1011, 1019, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) and S.Rep.No. 1686. "18 U.S.C §1165 was 
designed to fill that gap.95 United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505, 1512, n. 11 (10th Cir, 
1985)(A Uinta Valley case.) No "gap in the present law" would have existed if states had 
jurisdiction to prosecute hunting and fishing ofifenses occuring on Indian lands. There has 
been no change in federal or state law that would confer such jurisdicition on the State. 
1. The alleged offenses took place in Indian country. The 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that Indian lands consist of aU lands within the exterior boundaries of 
the Uinta and Uncompahgre Reservations, except those lands that passed from trust to fee 
status pursuant to non-Indian settlement under the 1902-1905 allotment legislation. Act of 
May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat 263, 263-64; Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 994,32 Stat 982, 
997-998; Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat 189,207-08; Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 
1479,33 Stat 1048,1069-70. Those lands that passed to fee status under these acts did so 
"under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States.* 
Ute Tribe v. Utah. 114 F.3d at 1517. The 10th Circuit further ruled that determining which 
lands were homesteaded under the 1902-1905 legislation would require a title search. 114 
F.3d at 1530. This title search has never taken place. Inasmuch as the burden is upon the 
State to establish jurisdiction, the burden is squarely upon the State to conduct such a title 
search before attempting to assert jurisdiction over the Defendants. It is indisputable that 
the locations at which the Defendants are alleged to h$ve committed the offenses are 
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as recognized by the 
federal government, and that those locations have never been homesteads or townsites 
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under the 1902-1905 Acts. 
The alleged offenses also took place squarely within the definition of Indian 
country as set forth in federal statute: 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, 
the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§1151 et 
seq.], means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under 
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the 
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all 
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. §1151. See also Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State 
Penitentiarv, 368 U.S. 351, 357, 82 S.Ct. 424, 428, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962). This places the 
location within the jurisdiction of the United States and the Indian tribe, exclusive of the 
State. 18 U.S.C. §1152 states: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of 
the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place 
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian 
against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the 
local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the 
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian 
tribes respectively. 
The trial court took the remarkable position that since the exterior boundaries of 
the reservation had been reduced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 
399,114 S.Ct 958,127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994), and neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the 
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State of Utah had defined those boundaries, the reservation had no boundaries! 261. The 
court could not be persuaded that the 10th Circuit had in fact defined those boundaries 
subsequent to Hagen. and that the State of Utah had acquiesced in that ruling by failing to 
pursue its petition for certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court. Ute Tribe v. Utah. 114 
F.3d 1513 (10* Cir. 19971 cert denied 522 U.S. 1107, 118 S.Ct 1034,140 L.Ed.2d 101 
(1998). 580, p. 41. There is simply no question that the alleged offenses took place in 
Indian country. 
2. The State has no jurisdiction if the victim of the alleged offense is an Indian 
tribe. "The language and history of 18 U.S.C. § 1165 show that the right of Indians to 
control hunting, trapping and fishing on their lands is a prerogative of ownership which 
the United States recognizes as a matter of federal law." United States v. Finch. 548 F.2d 
822, 834 (9th Cir. 1977). In an effort to protect these rights, and in exercise of its rights of 
self-government, the Ute Tribe enacted Ordinance 00-001 for the purpose of regulating 
the activities of non-members on the reservation. This exercise of the Tribe's inherent 
right of self-government, as well as the Tribe's interest in fish and game on Indian lands, 
takes a high priority over state jurisdiction. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. State of New 
Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 728 (10* Cir. 1980). Any effort by the State to exercise 
jurisdiction infringes upon these inherent rights of the Tribe. M- at 730. Under Utah law, 
the State has no jurisdiction over any crime committed in Indian country in which the 
victim is an Indian or an Indian tribe. State v. Valdez. 65 P.3d 1191 (Utah App. 2003). 
The Ute Tribe clearly claims an interest in the fish and game of the reservation. Section 
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8-1-3(1) of the Ute Law and Order Code slates: 
All wildlife now or hereafter within the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, not held by private ownership legally acquired, and which for 
purposes of this Code shall include all big game animals, game birds, 
waterfowl, game fish, amphibians and fur-bearing animals mentioned in 
this Code, are hereby declared to be the property of the Ute Indian Tribe 
and no right, title, interest or property therein can be acquired or transferred 
or possession thereof had or maintained except as herein expressly 
provided. (Emphasis added). 
Inasmuch as the Ute Tribe claims ownership of the big game which the Defendants 
are alleged to have taken, the victim of the alleged offense is a federally supervised Indian 
tribe, and the State of Utah is divested of jurisdiction to prosecute. State v. Valdez. 65 
P.3d 1191 (Utah App. 2003). Notwithstanding this clear statement, the trial court held 
that na victim could be identified. 580, p, 38. 
While the Indians of Utah Territory do not recognize the authority of the Ute 
Tribe, the State of Utah is nevertheless bound to recognize the Ute Tribe's authority over 
Indians and persons committing acts against Indian property within Indian country. The 
powers of self-government reserved to Indian tribes explicitly include "the inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over all Indians." 25 U.S.C. §1301(2)(Emphasis added). Thus, Indian tribes may exercise 
jurisdiction over all Indians within a reservation, not just enrolled members of the 
resident tribe. Federal and tribal jurisdiction are therefore exclusive within Indian country 
to the exclusion of State authority. 
Concurrent State jurisdiction can only be asserted where it has not been preempted 
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by the operation of federal law. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe. 462 U.S. 324, 
333, 103 S.Ct. 2378,2386, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983). Hunting and fishing within Indian 
country has been preempted by federal law. 462 U.S. at 337-338, 103 S.Ct. 2388, 67 Stat 
588, 18U.S.C. §1162(b), 18U.S.C. §1165, 25U.S.C. §1321(b). Unless and until the 
State can meet its burden of showing that it has expressly been granted jurisdiction within 
Indian country by act of Congress, and by showing that Congress has not preempted for 
itself and for the resident Indian tribes the regulation of hunting and fishing within Indian 
country, the State cannot exercise jurisdiction over the Defendant. 
C. The State has no jurisdiction over the conduct in question. 
Article EI, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they 
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying 
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall 
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain 
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall 
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the 
United States. (Emphasis added) 
Before the State can exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, 
three things must occur: (1) There must be a cession of such jurisdiction to the State by 
Congress, (2) any Indian tribe potentially subject to such jurisdiction must consent thereto 
by special election in accordance with federal law, and (3) the State constitution must be 
amended to eliminate any provisions preventing the exercise of such jurisdiction. 
Inasmuch as the State has the burden to prove jurisdiction, it is incumbent upon the State 
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to prove that these three conditions have been satisfied. 
The first condition is addressed by 25 U.S.C. §1321, which specifically excludes 
hunting and fishing rights from State jurisdiction: 
fa) Consent of United States; force and effect of criminal laws. The 
consent of the United States is hereby given any State not having 
jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or against Indians in the 
areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the 
consent of the Indian tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part 
thereof which could be affected by such assump-tion, such measure of 
jurisdiction over any or all of such offenses committed within such Indian 
country or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same 
extent that such State has jurisdiction over any such offense committed 
elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws of such State shall have 
the same force and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as they 
have elsewhere within that State. 
(b) Alienation, encumbrance* taxation, and use of property; hunting. 
trapping, or fishing. Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, 
encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water 
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that 
is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the 
use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, 
agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall 
deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, 
privilege or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute 
with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or 
regulation thereof (Emphasis added) 
In regard to amendment of the State Constitution, 25 U.S.C. §1324 provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any enabling Act for the 
admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the 
people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or 
existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the 
assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the 
provisions of this title. The provisions of this title shall not become effective 
with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the 
people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or 
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statutes, as the case may be. (Emphasis added) 
In regard to consent by the affected tribe, 25 U.S.C § 1326 provides: 
State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this title with respect to 
criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, shall be 
applicable in Indian country only where the enrolled Indians within the 
affected area of such Indian country accept such jurisdiction by a majority 
vote of the adult Indians voting at a special election held for that purpose. 
The Secretary of the Interior shall call such special election under such 
rules and regulations as he may prescribe, when requested to do so by the 
tribal council or other governing body, or by 20 per centum of such enrolled 
adults. (Emphasis added) 
The federal statute which otherwise cedes to the states criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians in Indian country specifically excludes hunting, fishing, and trapping from State 
jurisdiction. The State Constitution has never been amended to pennit State jurisdiction 
over Indian country within the State, and neither the Uintah Band nor the Ute Tribe has 
ever held a special election to consent to such jurisdiction. Thus, as a matter of State 
constitutional law the State cannot exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants for the 
offenses charged. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, Order of March 18,2001, page 10 
(D.Utah, 2:00CV734C), ajfd, 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002). 
This is specifically applicable to the Uinta Valley and the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, where an Indian exercising pre-existing hunting rights cannot be criminally 
charged for exercising those rights. United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d at 1512. Indeed, the 
same court noted that no Utah Indian tribe has ever consented to State jurisdiction. 752 
F.2d at 1508, n, 1. It is hard to imagine how the State could exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over conduct that cannot be defined as a crime in federal court and for which, explicitly, 
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jurisdiction has never been conferred upon the State. 
L Hunting and fishing are sovereign rights predating the existence of the United 
States. "Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to them, 
unless such rights were clearly relinquished by treaty or have been modified by Congress. 
These rights need not be expressly mentioned in the treaty." Conway. 286 F.3d at 1202, 
quoting United States v. Dion. 476 U.S. 734, 738, 106 S.Ct 2216,90 L.Ed.2d 767 
(1986)(Internal citations omitted). This is in direct contrast with federal benefits, which 
are conferred by Congress and require federal recognition. Western Shoshone Business 
Council v. Babbitt 1 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 1993). Hunting and fishing rights are not 
"statutory benefits," because they were not created by Congress, but rather are incidents 
of sovereignly pre-dating the creation of the United States. United States v. Oregon. 657 
F.2d 1009, 1013-1014 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Moreover, "jtjhe Department of the Interior cannot under any 
circumstances abrogate an Indian treaty directly or indirectly. Only 
Congress can abrogate a treaty, and only by making absolutely clear its 
intention to do so/' United Spates v. Washington. 641 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9* 
Cir. 1981); see also Dion. 476 U.S. at 738-40, 106 S.Ct. 2216; Wilson. 442 
U.S. at 670=71, 99 S.Ct. 2529. Thus, the fact that a tribe is not adminis-
tratively recognized does not affect that tribe's vested treaty rights. See 
Greene v. Babbitt. 64 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Menominee 
Tribe v. United States. 391 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct 1705, 20 L.Ed.2d697 
(1968)(treaty hunting rights survived despite congressional termination of 
all formal tribal political authority). "[A] tribe's recognition or lack of 
recognition by the Secretary of the Interior does not determine whether the 
tribe has vested treaty rights." Greene. 64 F.3d at 1270. "Non-recognition 
of the tribe by the federal government and the failure of the Secretary of the 
Interior to approve a tribe's enrollment may result in loss of statutory 
benefits, but can have no impact on vested treaty rights." Id. (quoting 
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
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Conway. 286 F.3d at 1203. The sole benefit derived from being included on the 
Secretary of the Interior's list is the right to receive benefits created by Congress, a 
benefit the Indians of Utah Territory are not seeking. Conway. 286 F.3d at 1204. The 
facts as set forth at the beginning of this Brief, regarding the identity of the Indians of 
Utah Territory and the rights retained under the Executive Order of October 3,1861, and 
the Act of May 5,1864, are "clearly sufficient5' to establish the hunting and fishing rights 
of those Indians as a matter of law. Conway, 286 F.3d at 1204. 
2. Hunting and fishing rights do not require enrollment in a federally recognized 
tribe. It is well established that numerous tribes exercise treaty rights without federal 
recognition. United States v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 901 F.2d 772, 776 n. 10 (9th Cir. 
1990), Greene v. U.S., 996 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1993)(StiHaguamish, Upper Skagit, and 
other unrecognized Washington Indian tribes exercise treaty fishing rights). Even 
terminated tribes (which the Uintah Band has never been) retain treaty hunting rights 
despite congressional tennination of all formal political authority. Menominee Tribe v. 
U.S.. supra, Conway. 286 F.3d at 1203. There is simply no justification in federal law for 
the trial court's view that only enrolled members of federally recognized tribes may 
exercise tribal hunting and fishing rights. 
Consistent with federal law, the Utah courts have recognized very simply that, 
"Formal enrollment in a federally recognized tribe is not required" to establish individual 
Indian status. State v. Hagen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990), reversed on other 
grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1993), affWHagenv. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 
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127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). In its Hagen decision, the Utah Court of Appeals was asked to 
address (1) the territorial limits of the reservation, and (2) the defendant's status as an 
Indian. The court relied on federal law in determining that the alleged offense took place 
in Indian country, and having done so then found that the defendant's Indian status was 
sufficient to defeat State jurisdiction in that Indian country, even though he was neither a 
Ute nor an Indian of Utah Territory. 
The Court of Appeals specific finding pn the territorial issue was overturned by 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hagen. 858 P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 1992). However, its 
specific finding on Indian status was net: "We conclude that Myton, Utah, where 
defendant's alleged offense occurred, is therefore not in Indian country. Thus, in the 
instant case defendant's criminal conduct may form the basis of state court jurisdiction, 
regardless of defendant's personal Indian status" 858 P.2d at 926 (Emphasis added, 
internal citations omitted). This ruling was affinned by the United States Supreme Court, 
sustaining the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of territorial jurisdiction and leaving the 
Utah Court of Appeals' ruling on Indian status untouched. Hagen v. Utaftu 510 U.S. 399, 
114 S.Ct 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). The ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
regard to Indian status thus remains the law binding upon the trial court. 
As noted by the Utah Court of Appeals, "the defendant must be recognized as an 
Indian either by the federal government or by some tribe or society of Indians," State v. 
Hagen- 802 P,2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990)(Emphasis added). Enrollment in a federally 
recognized tribe automatically constitutes recognition of individual Indian status by the 
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federal government, regardless of blood quantum. Inasmuch as the Hagen ruling refers to 
recognition by the federal government or by some tribe or society of Indians, it is clear 
that under State law, there is no requirement that the tribe or society of Indians be itself 
recognized by the federal government. This is consistent with the federal government's 
position that a tribe does not have to be federally recognized to possess hunting and 
fishing rights. Conway. 286 F.3d at 1203-1204. Curiously, though the trial court and the 
State cited this language with approval repeatedly, they refused to follow it 579, pp. 5, 
24, 27; 262. 
3. The Uintah Band possesses vested treaty rights. The Indians of Utah Territory 
associated with the Uintah Band are a separate and distinct people from the White Rivers 
and the Uncompahgre Utes, and are the only Indians to whom apply the Executive Order 
of October 3, 1861, and the Act of Congress of May 5, 1864. The separate rights of the 
Uintah Band have been the subject of both federal acts and rulings. Act of May 5,1864, 
ch. LXXVn, 13 Stat 64; Act of May 24, 1888, ch. 310,25 Stat. 157; Act of June 4,1898, 
ch. 376, 30 Stat. 429; Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263; Joint Resolution of 
June 19, 1902, Resolution No. 31, 32 Stat. 744; Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 
997; Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069; Act of June 28, 1910, ch. 140, §23, 
36 Stat 284; Hackford v. Babbitt 14 F.3d 1457,1469 (10* Cir. 1994); Ute Indian Tribe 
of Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah- 935 F.Supp. 1473, 1502 (D.Utah 1996). 
By Act of May 24, 1888 (ch. 310,25 Stat 157), Congress removed certain lands 
from the Uintah Valley Indian Reservation (as distinct from the Uncompahgre 
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Reservation), directed that the consent of such Indians (i.e., the Uintah Band) be 
obtained, and that the proceeds from the sales of such lands be held in trust on behalf of 
those same Indians. By Act of June 4, 1898 (ch. 376, 30 Stat. 429) Congress directed that 
allotments be made to the Indians of the Uintah Indian Reservation, and specifically 
defined these as separate and distinct from allotments to Indians of the Uncompahgre 
Reservation. The Act of May 27, 1902 (ch, 888,32 Stat 263) specifically distinguishes 
between the Uintah, Whiteriver, and Uncompahgre Bands, as does the Joint Resolution of 
June 19, 1902 (Resolution No. 31, 32 Stat. 744), the Act of March 3, 1903 (ch. 994, 32 
Stat, 997), and the Act of March 3, 1905 (ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069). 
Without exception, all allotment legislation pertaining to the Uintah Valley 
Reservation recognizes the separate rights and status of the Uintah Band. By Act of June 
28, 1910 (ch. 140, §23, 36 Stat. 284) Congress specifically compensated the Uintah 
Indians, and the Uintah Indians alone, for lands appropriated for the Strawbeny 
Reclamation Project. Section 677r of the UPA states: '"Nothing in sections 677-677aa of 
this title shall effect any claim heretofore filed against the United States by the tribe, or 
the individual bands comprising the tribe." This section recognizes the separate existence 
and rights of the Uintah Band. 
No allotments were ever made to or by the Ute Tribe, inasmuch as allotment was 
repealed by the Wheeler-Howard Act in 1934 (25 U.S.C. §461), and the Ute Tribe was 
not called into existence under that act until 1937. 25 U.S.C. §476. This is significant, 
because all water on the reservation has a priority date of October 3,1861, Hackford v. 
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Babbitt 14 F.3d at 1469, citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct 207, 52 
L.Ed. 340 (1908). Inasmuch as neither the Whiterivers nor the Uncompahgres inhabited 
the reservation in 1861, nor can claim any rights under the Executive Order of October 3, 
1861, or the Act of Congress of May 5, 1864, ratifying that act, all Indian water rights in 
the Uintah Valley are necessarily those of the Uintah Band. 
The Ute Tribe could not allot what it did not possess, and indeed, the Ute Tribe 
specifically renounces in its own constitution any claim to make such allotments. Article 
n, Sec. 2(a): "No property rights shall be acquired or lost through membership in this 
organization except as provided herein," Article VI, Sec. 4: "Any rights and powers 
heretofore vested in the Tribe or bands of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation but not 
expressly referred to in this Constitution shall not be abridged by this article." Article 
Vm, Sec. 1: "Allotted lands, including heirship lands, within the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation shall continue to be held as heretofore, by their present owners The right 
of the individual Indian to hold or part with his land, as under existing law, shall not be 
abrogated by anything contained in this Constitution." 
And just as water rights derive solely from the Uintah Band, to whom they were 
allotted, so, too, do the hunting and fishing rights on the reservation derive solely from 
the Uintah Band. It is well established that descendants of allottees are entitled to federal 
protection. United States v. Osage County, 251 U.S. 128, 133,40 S.Ct. 100, 102,64 
L.Ed. 184 (1919). So likewise are the hunting and fishing rights of the Uintah Band and 
their descendants protected under federal law, Ute Tribe v. Utah, 935 F.Supp. at 1502. 
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4. The Uintah Band is a separate and independent entity. Nothing in the 
incorporation of the Ute Tribe in 1937 or its constitution gives that tribe any right to 
determinine either the membership or the rights of the Uintah Band. The Uintah Band has 
the exclusive right to determine its own membership. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49, 72, n. 32, 98 S.Ct 1670, 1684, n. 32, 56 L,Ed.2d 106 (1978). Most of Uintahs 
affected by the UPA were never listed on the Ute tribal rolls until their names appeared 
on the terminaton roll in 1956. Prior to that time they had only been listed as Uintahs. 
"The roll makes no reference to band affiliation." Hackford v. Babbitt 14 F.3d at 1462. If 
it had, it would have shown that 456 of the 490 terminated "Utes" were Uintahs. Only 
208 Uintahs remained enrolled as Utes. 
Just as the Ute Tribe has no authority to determine the membership of the Uintah 
Band, so likewise a minority has no authority to expel a majority. Only the Uintahs could 
expel Uintahs, and only a majority could do so. That has never taken place. The Ute 
Tribe never made allotments to the Uintahs. The Uintahs brought their allotments with 
them into the Ute Tribe. The Ute Tribe never granted hunting and fishing rights to the 
Uintahs. The Uintahs brought their hunting rigihts with them. When the Uintahs were 
expelled from the Ute Tribe, they took their allotments, their water rights, and their 
hunting and fishing rights with them. Hackford v. Babbitt 14 F.3d at 1469. Ute Tribe v. 
Utah. 935 F.Supp. at 1502. 
Only recognized Indians could receive allotments. Act of Feb. 8,1887, ch. 119,24 
Stat 388-391. Their descendants retain Indian status regardless of blood quantum. United 
39 
States v. Osage Counts supra. Due to the strength of its traditions, the Uintah Band has 
never had the need to impose a minimum blood quantum requirement upon its members, 
and has never had one imposed upon it by Congress. This has remained so, notwith-
standing the numerous allotment and other acts passed specifically on its behalf. Those 
acts nevertheless confirm that the Uintahs are recognized as Indians by the federal 
government. 
The Defendants are Indians of Utah Territory and members of the Uintah Band. As 
such they retain all rights reserved under the Executive Order of October 3,1861, and the 
Act of May 5, 1864, which the Indians of Utah Territory brought to the Uintah Band. Just 
as the allotment rights of the Uintah Band never belonged to the Ute Tribe, and never 
could under the Ute Constitution, so likewise the Ute Tribe has no claim upon the hunting 
and fishing rights of the Uintah Band. And just as the allotment and water rights of the 
Uintah Band have never come under State jurisdiction, so likewise the State of Utah has 
no jurisdiction over the hunting and fishing rights of the Uintah Band, Regardless of how 
Ute tribal assets may pass under the UPA, Uintah tribal assets continue under the 
allotment and other acts by which they were recognized prior to the creation of the Ute 
Tribe. 
5. Indian tribes determine their own membership criteria. It is well established that 
each Indian tribe has the right to determine its own membership criteria. Santa Clara 
Pueblo v.Martinez, 436, U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 
(1978); U.S.v.VonMurdock 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 1997). Once a tribe has 
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recognized a person as a member, the only question for the State is whether the tribe itself 
is genuine. The first question thus is not whether the Defendants have sufficient Indian 
blood, but whether they are recognized as Indians by a tribe possessing treaty rights under 
federal law. Once it is established that the tribe has legal rights, it is sufficient to show 
that the Defendants are recognized as an Indian by that tribe. If they are so recognized, 
the State has no more right to question their blood quantum than it does to question the 
blood quantum of an enrolled Ute. 
Under Hagen (Utah App. 1990), blood quantum is not relevant unless a person is 
claiming Indian status without being affiliated with a tribe. Otherwise, blood quantum is 
neither the primary nor the detennining factor in determining whether a person is an 
Indian for purposes of State jurisdiction, "[T]he terms concerning "blood," such as "full-
blood," "mixed-blood," "blood quantum," and related quantitative terms such as "half-
breed," are . . . without scientific basis." The Arbitrary Indian. Gail K. Sheffield, 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1997, page 83. "[T]he use of blood quantum to define the 
modem Indian population poses enormous conceptual and practical problems." American 
Indians: The First of this Land. Matthew C. Snipp, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1989, page 44. 
The U.S. Census Bureau does not require any blood quantum in determining 
Indian status. The Arbritary Indian, supra, pages 86-87. Cohen's Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law, the definitive authority on Indian law, states: "In dealing with Indians, the 
federal government is dealing with members or descendants of political entities, that is, 
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Indian tribes, not with persons of a particular racer F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law, (1982 ed.), page 19, citing United States v. Antelope. 430 U.S. 641,646 
(1977XEmphasis added). 
[F]ederal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon 
impermissible [racial] classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in 
the unique status of Indians as "a separate people" with their own political 
institutions. Federal regulation of tribes, therefore, is governance of once-
sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a 
'"racial' group consisting of 'Indians' " 
Id., citing Morton v. Mancari 417 U.S. 535, 553, n.24 (1974). See also Cohen, 
page 654. 
"The Court has also supported its holdings in these cases by characterizing Indians 
in federal law as a political rather than as a racial classification. The Court said that 
Indian laws apply by virtue of tribal membership rather than because of the race of the 
parties." Cohen page 655, citing Fisher v. District Court 424 U.S. 382,391-91 (1976), 
Morton v. Mancari supra. 
Race is synonymous with ancestry. The Arbitrary Indian, supra, page 133. 
However, in contrast to a race-based approach, individual status follows tribal status, and 
there can be no Indian without a tribe. See Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1979). 
'The tribal experience - the collective experience — is the essence of being Indian in this 
modern world. There are, as we have seen, tribes that function as such in the 
sociocultural sense, even if they are not recognized by the federal government as 
sovereign political entities." The Arbitrary Indian, supra, page 95. "The courts have 
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consistently recognized that one of an Indians tribe's most basic powers is the authority 
to determine questions of its own membership The power of an Indian tribe to 
determine questions of its own membership derives from the character of an Indian tribe 
as a distinct political entity/9 Cohen, supra, page 20. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 US, 49, 72 n. 32 (1978). The common law does not apply to Indian tribes, 
and even the federal government must recognize membership based on tribal custom. 
Waldron v. United States, 143 Fed. 413 (C.C.S.D. 1905). 
Once it is established that the Indians of Utah Territory associated with the Uintah 
Band possess treaty rights that are protected under federal law, it should have been 
sufficient for the trial court to know that the Defendants are recognized by the Uintah 
Band as a member of that tribe, and the action should have been dismissed for lack of 
State jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the trial court did not apply this rule. 
D. The Ute Partion Act had no effect on vested treaty rights. 
The trial court received extensive briefing as to the effect of the Ute Partition Act 
of August 27,1954 (68 Stat 877; 25 U.S.C. §677-677aa). This was a red herring. The 
UPA had no effect on vested treaty rights, such as hunting and fishing, and had no effect 
on the separate rights and assets of the Indians of Utah Territory associated with the 
Uintah Band. The court ruled otherwise. 
1. By its own terms, the effect of the UPA is limited to federal benefits. 25 U.S.C 
§677, the preamble to the Ute Partition Act states: 
The purpose of sections 677-677aa of this title is to provide for the 
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partition and distribution of the assets of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation in Utah between the mixed-blood and full-blood 
members thereof; for the termination of Federal supervision over the trust, 
and restricted property, of the mixed-blood members of said tribe; and for a 
development program for the fidl-blood members thereof, to assist them in 
preparing for termination of Federal supervision over their property. 
(Emphasis added) 
"Federal supervision" is a benefit created by Congress, and can in like manner be 
revoked by Congress or conditioned on tribal recognition by the Secretary of the Interior. 
As has now been well-established, hunting and fishing rights are not a federal benefit, but 
rather, an inherent treaty right that cannot be revoked absent a treaty or an act of 
Congress explicit as to its intent Hunting and fishing rights also cannot be conditioned 
upon federal recognition, which is itself a benefit, not a treaty right Conway, 286 F.3d at 
1203-1204; Menominee v. U.S., 391 U.S. at 412-413, 88 S.Ct at 1711. 
The UFA makes no mention of treaty rights at all, and u[a]t the outset, we note that 
the 1954 Act does not contain provisions specifically treating the right to hunt and fish. 
We believe that proper construction of the 1954 Act compels the conclusion that the 
mixed-blood Ute Indians retained the right to hunt and fish on reservation land." Felten 
752 F.2d at 1509. This is the effect, or rather lack of effect, of the UFA on hunting and 
fishing rights. 
It is also worth noting that the UPA, again by its own terms, was contingent upon a 
number of circumstances, including preparation of a distribution plan for the mixed-blood 
group (25 U.S.C. §6771), preparation of a development plan for the fiill-blood group, and 
ultimate termination of the fidl-blood group. Inasmuch as none of these conditions was 
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ever fulfilled, nor ever shall be, the UPA is void at the outset for failure of its essential 
conditions. 
2. The UPA specifically exempts indivisible assets from its operation. The relevant 
portions of the Ute Partition Act explicitly exempt indivisible assets of the Ute tribe from 
the effects of termination: 
Effective on the date of publication of the final rolls as provided in 
section 677g of this title the tribe thereafter shall consist exclusively of full-
blood members. Mixed-blood members shall have no interest therein except 
as otherwise provided in sections 677-677aa of this title. 
25 U.S.C. §677d (Emphasis added). The applicable provisions are as follows: 
The tribal business committee representing the full-blood group, and 
the authorized representatives of the mixed-blood group, within sixty days 
after the publication of the final membership roll, as provided in section 
677g of this title, shall commence a division of assets of the tribe that are 
then susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution. . . . All 
unadjudicated or unliquidated claims against the United States, all gas, oil, 
and mineral rights of every kind, and all other assets not susceptible to 
equitable and practicable distribution shall be managed jointly by the 
Tribal Business Committee and the authorized representatives of the mixed-
blood group, subject to such supervision by the Secretary as is otherwise 
required by law,. . . 
25 U.S.C. §677i (Emphasis added). 
When any mixed-blood member of the tribe has received his 
distributive share of the tribal assets distributed to the mixed-blood group 
under the provisions of section 677i of this title, whether such distribution 
is made in part or in whole to a corporation, partnership, or trusteeship in 
which he is interested, or otherwise, the Secretary is authorized and 
directed to immediately transfer to him unrestricted control of all other 
property held in trust for such mixed-blood member by the United States, 
and shall further remove all restrictions on the sale or encumbrance of trust 
or restricted property owned by such member of the tribe, and Federal 
supervision of such member and his property shall thereby be terminated, 
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except as to his remaining interest in tribal property in the form of my 
unadjudicated or unliquidated claims against the United States, all gas, oil, 
and mineral rights of every kind, and all other tribal assets not susceptible 
to equitable and practicable distribution, all of which shall remain subject 
to the terms of sections 677-677aa of this title, notwithstanding anything 
contained in said sections to the contrary. 
25 U.S.C. §677o(a). (Emphasis added). This provision exempts all assets not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution from the effects of the termination 
statute. The final sentence excludes these assets from the definitive section of the UPA, 
which once again limits its effects to termination of federal benefits: 
Upon removal of Federal restrictions on the property of each 
individual mixed-blood member of the tribe, the Secretary shall publish in 
the Federal Register a proclamation declaring that the Federal trust 
relationship to such individual is terminated. Thereafter, such individual 
shall not be entitled to any of the services performed for Indians because of 
his status as an Indian. All statutes of the United States which affect Indians 
because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to such 
member over which supervision has been terminated, and the laws of the 
several States shall apply to such member in the same maimer as they apply 
to other citizens within their jurisdiction. 
25 U.S.C. §677v. (Emphasis added). Thus, the UPA has no effect on assets not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution and has no effect on treaty rights as 
separate from federal benefits. 
3. Hunting and fishing rights are an indivisible asset. In a Memorandum dated May 
17,1996, William R. McConkie, Acting Field Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, 
stated the following: 
[T]he Federal District Court for Utah, in a case dealing with the right of 
Mixed Bloods to hunt and fish on the Reservation, ruled that the terminated 
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Mixed-Bloods as a group retained an in common property right in nondivisible 
assets pf the Tribe. 
The mixed bloods retained interests in common with the tribal 
membership in oil, gas, and mineral resources of every kind, all 
unadjudicated or unliquidated claims against the United States, "and 
all other assets not susceptible to equitable and practicable 
distribution." 25 U.S.C, §677i. 
Unted States v. Felter. 546 F.Supp. 1002, 1023 (D. Utah 1982). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled "that the right to 
hunt and fish on the reservation is an 'asset not susceptible to equitable and 
practicable distribution'" under tbe UPA. United States v. Felter> 752 F.2d 1505, 
1512 (10* Cir. 1985). Emphasis added. Thus the rulings on (1) minerals, and (2) 
hunting and fishing are each applicable to the other. Both assets are considered 
nondivisible tribal assets. 
[T]he Ute Termination Act . . . preserved individual rights to share in 
tribal property while otherwise altering or terminating the 
individual's relationship with the tribe It constrasts sharply with 
other legislation that expressly provided for complete severance of 
tribal relations to an individual While Congress may have the 
power to wholly partition the tribal estate . . . it must express its 
intent to do so in plain and unambiguous terms. 
Felter, at 546 F. Supp, 1026, citations omitted. Emphasis added. Seg United State 
v. Felter* 752 F.2d 1505, 1508. The ownership of these assets are held in common 
today. Id. 
MIXED-BLOOD RETAIN TRIBAL STATUS AS REGARD NONDIVIDED ASSETS 
The Mixed-Bloods have not lost their status as tribal members as concerns 
those assets not susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution. 
The United States brought a misdemeanor action against a Mixed-Blood 
(Oranna Bumgamer Felter) on the theory that she had lost her status as an Indian 
by virtue of the Termination Proclamation issued by the Secretary of the Interior in 
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August, 1961, alleging that she thereby lost her right to hunt and fish on 
Reservation lands. The United States Federal District Court for the District of Utah 
and the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals both ruled that the Mixed-
Blood members were terminated only as regards such property as was distributed 
to them, They were not terminated as regards such property as was not distributed 
to them. 
Federal supervision of mixed-blood members and their property was 
terminated, "except as to [their] remaining interest in . . . tribal 
assets not susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution." [25 
U.S.C. §677i], §677o(a). 
United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505 (1985) at 1507. Emphasis added. To 
amplify this point the court referred to Section 5 of the UPA stating that after 
publication of the final rolls of Full-Bloods and Mixed-Bloods, "the tribe shall 
thereafter consist exclusively of Full-Blood members. Mixed-Blood members shall 
have no interest therein except as otherwise provided in the subchapter." The court 
held that the UPA did "otherwise" provide for a continued interest in assets not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution. Id. Also, 14 at 1508. 
The Federal District Court for Utah, in United States v. Felter, 546 F.Supp. 
1002 (1982), recognized that the tribal relationship of the mixed*bloods did not 
end at termination: 
While withdrawal from membership in the tribe would generally 
result in the extinguishment of all individual rights of user in tribal 
property, see 1 Opinions of the Solicitor of the Dep't of Interior 
Relating to Indian Affairs 811-812 (1979), the Ute Tennination Act 
called at most for only an incomplete withdrawal from the rights of 
tribal membership. Section 677d of the Act provided that mixed-
blood members enrolled on the final mixed-blood roll "shall have no 
interest [in the Tribe] except as otherwise provided in section 677-
677aa of this title,5' i.e., the entire Ute Tennination Act 
Id. at 1023. Emphasis added. 
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It is important to note that "termination" does not mean that 
someone's identity as an Indian is ended. Rather, what is terminated 
is (1) eligibility for federal services made available to those 
recognized as "Indian," and (2) the duties and powers invested in the 
United States regarding the management of their affairs,, or their 
property. 
M- at 1004. 
Nor is "termination" necessarily the end of tribal existence. Even 
when Congress has enacted legislation calling for the dissolution of 
specific tribes, something not done by the termination acts, the 
continued existence of the tribes in spite of legislation has led to a 
continuation of the federal tribal relationship. If tribal existence is to 
end, it is for the Indians to end it. 
Id. Footnote 3, citations omitted. While individual Mixed-Blood members 
of the Tribe have lost eligibility for certain federal services, see e.g., Maldonado v. 
Hodel 683 F.Supp. 1322 (D.Utah 1988), nevertheless the Mixed-Blood group 
remains part of the Tribe for the very limited but specific purpose of managing 
nondivisible tribal assets and enjoying the fruits thereof and of Reservation 
hunting and fishing. Also, the United States did not lose management of 
nondivisible property. United States v. Fefter. 752 F.2d 1507. 
William R. McConkie, Acting Field Solicitor, Memorandum from United States 
Department of the Interior. Office of the Solicitor, to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Management 
and Assistance Office. Re: Joint Management of Tribal Assets Not Susceptible to 
Equitable and Practicable Distribution. May 17,1996, pages 6-9. 
4. The UPA confers no jurisdiction on the State over hunting and fishing on Indian 
lands. Under 25 U.S.C. §677i, all assets susceptible of equitable and practicable 
distribution shall be allocated as agreed between the Full-bloods and the Mixed-bloods, 
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and all assets not so susceptible shall be managed jointly. Accordingly, on July 16,1958, 
the Ute Tribal Business Committee passed Resolution 58-163, which states in pertinent 
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE UINTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL 
BUSINESS COMMITTEE That the fish and game upon all lands to be 
received by the Mixed-Blood group pursuant to the agreed division, as 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall, from the date hereof be 
under the management and control of the Mixed-Blood group exclusively 
and said Mixed-Blood group, should they so desire, may sell hunting and 
fishing permits or licenses and retain all funds derived therefrom without 
accounting to the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
The "Mixed-Blood group" has never surrendered this exclusive right to manage 
and control 27% of fish and game upon Indian lands, including the right to sell permits to 
non-Indians. Under §677i, this agreement remains valid and subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal government and the Full-blood and Mixed-blood members of 
the Tribe. As noted previously, 25 U.S.C § 1321(b) provides that: 
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, 
or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, 
belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held 
in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation 
imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of 
such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, 
or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any 
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege or 
immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect 
to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation 
thereof. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, as an indivisible asset over which the Tribe and the federal government 
retain exclusive control, the State cannot exercise jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on 
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Indian lands- Indeed, the State cannot exercise any criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands 
except as such jurisdiction is conferred upon it in accordance with 25 U.S.C §1321. 
Confronted with a similar assertion of state law in Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court noted 
that Arizona could not assert jurisdiction over Indian country inasmuch as the State 
constitution had not been amended to permit such jurisdiction and the affected Indians 
had not consented. McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 178-
179, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-66, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973). The court also noted that Utah's 
constitution is subject to the identical provision. 411 U.S. at 175, n. 14, 93 S.Ct at 1264 
n. 14. Indeed, the court has noted that Alaska and 13 other states are subject to the same 
provision. Metkalatka Indian Com.. Annette Islands Res, v. Egacu 369 U.S. 45, 58, 82 
S.Ct 552, 561, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962). The 10th Circuit has likewise noted that, pursuant 
to 25 U.S.C. §1321, Utah has no jurisdiction. United States v. Fetter. 752 F.2d 1505, 
1508 n.7 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on Indian lands 
derives from the inherent authority of tribes to exclude non-members from Indian lands, 
to govern the tribes internal affairs, and to control hunting and fishing on the reservation. 
This includes the power to define who may enter the reservation, to define the conditions 
upon which they may enter, to prescribe rules of conduct, to expel those who enter the 
reservation without proper authority or those who violate relevant laws, and to refer those 
violate the laws to the appropriate officials. Ouechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe. 531 F.2d 
408,411 (9* Cir. 1976). To the extent tribal courts lack authority to prosecute non-
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members, 18 U.S.C, §1165 was specifically enacted to protect the right of tribes to 
control hunting and fishing on tribal lands. United States v. Finch. 548 F.2d 822, 834 (9th 
Cir. 1976), United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505, 1512, n. 11 (10* Cir. 1985). 
On September 11, 2000, the Ute Tribe enacted tribal Ordinance 00-001 to regulate 
the very conduct at issue. Where a tribe has undertaken to regulate hunting and fishing by 
non-members on tribal lands in conjunction with federal law, state jurisdiction is pre-
empted. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. N.C. Wildlife. 588 E2d. 75, 78 (4th Cir. 
1978). This is particularly so where a federal statute, such as §677i, reserves regulation of 
hunting and fishing to the tribe and the Secretary of the Interior. Metkalatka v. Egan> 
supra\ Mescalero Apache Tribe v. State of New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, (10* Cir. 1980). 
In summary, any issue of jurisdiction over the Defendants is between the Ute Tribe 
and the federal government. There is simply no provision for State jurisdiction within 
Indian country as it has been defined by the UPA, by the U.S. Supreme Court, and by the 
10* Circuit. See Ute Tribe v. Utak 114 F.3d at 1517. 
5. Termination cannot be imputed to persons not included on the termination roll. 
As noted before, Rick Reber and Steve Thunehorst's mother, Leanna Chivers Thunehorst, 
were bom prior to enactment of the UPA. At the time of their birth, they were eligible for 
enrollment in the Ute Tribe, and possessed all of the rights incident to that eligibility, 
including hunting and fishing rights. When Mr. Reber and Ms. Chivers were still young 
children, the roll of Mixed-Blood members was compiled in accordance with the Act of 
August 27, 1954. Neither Mr. Reber, Ms. Chivers, nor her sister, who is Mr. Atkins 
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mother, were included on the roll. In a Memorandum dated September 21, 1955, the 
solicitor for the Department of the Interior indicated that the Secretary of the Interior did 
not possess any authority under the UPA to transfer minor children onto the Mixed-blood 
roll: 
You have requested my opinion on the power of the Secretary to 
transfer a minor from the proposed full-blood roll to the mixed-blood roll 
upon application of the parent for himself and his minor children, pursuant 
to section 4 of the Act of August 27, 1954, Public Law 671-83rd Congress 
(68Stat 868). [25 U.S.C. 677c]. 
Section 4 states that any member of the tribe whose name appears on 
the proposed roll of full-blood members may apply to the Superintendent to 
become identified with and part of the mixed-blood roll provided that 
before such transfer is made the Secretary shall first certify that in his 
opinion such change in status is not detrimental to the best interests of the 
applicant. The provisions of the Act are silent with respect to the transfer of 
a minor to the mixed-blood roll. In this regard it differs from the Klamath 
Withdrawal Act of August 13, 1954 (68 Stat 718) which specifically gives 
the head of the family the right to file for himself and his minor children an 
election to withdraw from the tribe. 
Section 22 provides for the protection by the Secretary of the rights 
of minors and other members of the tribe in need of assistance and, further, 
that the appointment of guardians pursuant to State law will not be required 
until Federal supervision has terminated. The indications of this section and 
other provisions of the Act are that this protection was intended for the 
benefit of members of the mixed-blood roll. The restrictions on their trust 
and redestricted property are to terminate in accordance with Section 16 
and the assets of the mixed-blood group are to be distributed to the 
individual members under Section 13. 
It was apparent that the Act would result in some members of a 
family being placed on the full-blood roll and others on the mixed-blood 
roll. If it were contemplated that the integrity of the family was to be 
maintained with respect to their membership some provision it seems would 
have at least been made allowing members of a family to transfer from the 
mixed-blood roll to the full-blood roll. An examination of the legislative 
history of the Act is of no aid on the question posed. In the absence of any 
express language in the Act or Congressional intent shown in its legislative 
history it must be concluded that the Secretary does not have such power, 
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particularly when a transfer of a minor from the full-blood to the mixed-
blood roll would result in the taxation and removal of restrictions on his 
trust and restricted property and in loss of the right in Section 23 to share in 
Federal services available to Indians because of their status as Indians. 
J. Reuel Armstrong, Solicitor, Memorancfoni to Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
Re: Interpretation of Section 4 of the Act of August 27. 1954 (68 Stat. 8681M-36305, 
September 21,1955. This statement is consistent with the well established canon of 
construction that all ambiguous provisions in a treaty or act of Congress are to be 
construed in favor of the Indians, and a treaty or act cannot deprive Indians of their rights 
unless it is explicit in its intent to do so. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation. 470 
U.S. 226, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1258-59, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985). 
We believe the canon of statutory construction cited by the 
Government requires us to conclude that, because the 1954 Act is silent on 
the issue of whether the mixed-blood Ute Indians retained the right to hunt 
and fish on the reservation, we should not impute an intent on the part of 
Congress to abrogate this right of the mixed-blood Ute Indians. This 
"eminently sound and vital canon" of construction, Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7, 96 S.Ct 1793, 1797 n. 7, 48 
L.Ed.2d 274 (1976), provides that "statutes passed for the benefit of 
dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful 
expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians." Alaska Pacific 
Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, 39 S.Ct 40, 42, 63 L.Ed. 
138 (1918); see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392, 96 S.Ct 
2102, 2112, 48 L.Ed,2d 710 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 
199-200, 95 S.Ct 944,948,43 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975); see generally F. 
Cohen, [Handbook of Federal Indian Law] at 221-25. 
Felter. 752 F.2d at 1511. See also Id. at 1510, n. 8. Just as there is no provision in 
the UP A for terminating the hunting and fishing rights of persons included on the mixed-
blood roll, so likewise there is no provision in the UPA whatsoever for terminating the 
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rights of persons born prior to termination whose names were not included on the roll. 
Mr. Reber and Mrs. Thunehorst possess just as many rights today as they did at birth, and 
the State has no jurisdiction to interfere with their rights nor those of their children. 
6. The UPA has no effect on the separate assets of the Uintah Band. All hunting 
rights on Indian lands within the reservation derive from those of the Uintah Band, 
inasmuch as the Indians of Utah Territory are the only Indians having aboriginal rights on 
the reservation, and the Indians of Utah are only associated with the Uintah Band. The 
creation of the Ute Indian Tribe in 1937 did not alter this. Article VI, Section 4, of the 
Ute Tribal Constitution states: "Any rights and powers heretofore vested in the Tribe or 
bands of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation but not expressly referred to in this 
Constitution shall not be abridged by this article." The hunting and fishing rights of the 
Uintah band thus remain separate and distinct from those of the Ute Tribe. 
The 10th Circuit has acknowledged that water rights appurtenant to Indian lands on 
the reservation, whether derived from the Uintah Band or the Ute Tribe, are valid, and 
have a priority date of October 3,1861. Hackford v. Babbitt 14 F.3d at 1469. The rights 
of the Uintah Band, as separate from the Ute Tribe are thus apparent, inasmuch as the 
Indians of Utah associated with the Uintah Band are the only Indians to whom the Act of 
1861 applies. The Ute Indian Tribe, consisting of the Uintah, Whiteriver, and Uncompah-
gre bands, did not exist in 1861 and did not come into existence until January 19,1937. 
The hunting and fishing rights of the Uintah Band, no less than the water rights, 
remain unaffected by the UPA, inasmuch as the UPA only presumed to end federal 
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supervision over the common assets of the Ute Tribe, not over the separate rights and 
assets of the constituent bands. Mr. Reber has a right of user in those rights, just as Mr. 
Hackford has a right of user in the water rights of the Uintah Band. Hackford v. Babbitt 
14F.3datl467. 
In Felter. the 10th Circuit found that the defendant definitely possessed the right to 
hunt and fish in Indian country prior to enactment of the partition act. As a result, she had 
a tribal right of user that could not be deprived by termination. 752 F.2d at 1509-1510. 
Mr. Reber and Mrs. Thunehorst possessed the identical right of user at births with the 
added distinction that, unlike Ms. Felter, they were never included on the termination 
rolls. The Defendants are not claiming an inheritable right. They are claiming their own 
rights as Indians of Utah Territory. It is well-established that an act cannot deprive 
Indians of vested treaty rights absent an express intention to do so. U.S. v. Felter. 752 
F.2d 1505, 1511,1512 (10th Cir. 1985). The Partition Act does not express any intention 
to terminate anyone other than those Indians included on the mixed-blood rolls. Neither 
the Defendants nor their pre-born parents were on that roll, and therefore they retain all 
rights of the Uintah Band, including the right to hunt and fish on Indian lands. 
7. The trial court has no jurisdiction to interpret the UPA.» The Ute Partition Act is 
a federal act pertaining to federally protected rights on federal land. The Act does not 
confer jurisdiction on any other court, either State or tribal, to interpret or enforce its 
provisions. Affiliated Ute Citizens, et ai v. Ute Indian Tribe- Civil No. 89-C-982G 
(D.UtahXOrder of September 4,1990, page 4). Accordingly, the trial court had no 
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jurisdiction to extend the operation of the UPA to persons born prior to the UPA but not 
included on the termination roll. Nor did the court have any jurisdiction to apply the 
terms of the UPA to the independent rights of the Uintah Band. 
8. The UPA is unconstitutional. By its literal terms, the Ute Partition Act imposed 
termination on the basis of Indian blood quantum. In practice, termination was 
intentionally based on Uintah tribal status, a basis equally unjustifiable as public policy 
even at that time, as well as upon other factors left entirely unstated in the Act itself, and 
entirely contrary to Indian custom and culture. Many Indians who remained enrolled in 
the Ute Tribe, both in 1954 and today, do not have any more Indian blood than do those 
who were terminated. 
a. The UPA violates the Equal Protection clause of the XN^ Amendment The 
XIVth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Section 1, states in pertinent part: "No State 
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Under this clause, any legal distinctions based on race are subject to strict scrutiny. 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pqna. 515 U.S. 200, 115 S.Ct 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 
(1995). Although Indians constitute a distinct racial group, this clause is generally 
inapplicable to Indian law for the reasons stated previously in regard to each tribe's right 
to determine its own membership criteria. (See Section LC.5, supra, Indian tribes 
determine their own membership criteria.) 
The Ute Partition Act constitutes a dramatic exception to this rule. During the 
termination era, all other tribes subjected to termination were done so as a whole. This 
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practice was not inconsistent with the concept of tribes as political rather than racial 
entities. The UPA is unique in this respect, in that it first divided the tribe along racial 
lines. This utterly belies the concept of tribes as political rather than racial entities, and 
places the UPA squarely in violation of the XIY* Amendment. As such, it is completely 
void. Reber 281, Atkins 77, Thunehorst 78. 
b. The UPA is a covert attempt to eliminate all Indian rights in the Uintah Basin. 
The UPA's division of the Indians along racial lines raises serious questions in its 
own right. However, actual termination was based on factors more devious in their intent, 
specifically calculated to undercut the entire existence of the reservation. These factors 
included: Descent from Utah rather than Colorado Indians; Shoshone rather than Ute 
blood; Membership in the Uintah Band; and Matrilineal descent. 
L Descent from Utah rather than Colorado Indians. The Indians of Utah Territory 
associated with the Uintah Band are the only Indians who have any aboriginal, 
recognized, or priority claim to the lands of the Uinta Valley. The White River and 
Uncompahgre Bands do not have any aboriginal claim to any lands in Utah, having 
relinquished all claims upon their expulsion from Colorado. Thus, if the free Uintahs 
could be terminated as Indians, nobody would have any aboriginal, recognized, or 
priority claim to any property or sovereign rights within the Uinta Valley. As a result, all 
Indians would be divested of any federal protection and the Uinta Valley Reservation 
would cease to exist. This outcome has been repeatedly sought by the State of Utah. Ute 
Indian Tribe v. Utah- 935 F. Supp. at 1487. 
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However, notwithstanding the Uintahs were terminated as Utes, they have never 
been terminated as Indians of Utah Territory, as Shoshone Indians, nor as members of the 
Uintah Band. Thus, the reservation remains Indian country. 
ii. Shoshone rather than Ute blood. By emphasizing Ute blood, the Shoshone 
Indians of Utah Territory constituting the Uintah Band could be terminated under the Ute 
Partition Act, but only as Utes, not as Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory. The fact that 
the Indians of Utah Territory who were members of the Uintah Band were Shoshone 
emphasizes that the rights of the Uintah Band are separate and distinct from those of the 
White Rivers and the Uncompahgre Utes. 
iii. Membership in the Uintah Band. Prior to 1937, and subsequent to 1954, the 
Uintah Band have been a separate people, possessing separate rights. They surrendered 
none of these things by becoming part of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation in 1937, and they lost none of these rights by being expelled from that 
organization in 1954. 
A minority cannot dictate to a majority, and a separate tribe cannot dictate 
membership requirements to another tribe. 208 people cannot vote 456 people out of a 
tribe, the White River and Uncompahgre Bands cannot tell the Uintah Band who can or 
cannot be a Uintah, and Utes cannot tell Shoshones who is or is not Shoshone. 
iv. Matrilineal descent. For the most part, only Indians having non-Indian 
surnames were terminated from the Ute Tribe. Persons with Indian surnames remained on 
the Ute tribal rolls. In other words, only persons deriving their Indian status, rights, and 
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culture through matrilineal descent were terminated. Persons deriving their Indian status 
through patrilineal descent remained on the Ute rolls, regardless of blood quantum. 
Ironically, in both Ute and Shoshone cultures, Indian heritage is reckoned predominantly 
through matriarchal, not patriarchal succession. Patriarchal succession is a characteristic 
not of Indian culture, but of the predominant white socio-economic group inhabiting the 
State of Utah. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was enacted to counteract precisely 
such destruction of Indian cultural values and family connections. 25 U.S.C. §1901. 
It is arguable that Congress has the power to wipe out all rights of the Uintah 
Band, and thereby the rights of all Indians in the Uintah Basin. Such an intent would be 
reprehensible, but is nevertheless within the powers assumed by Congress. Nevertheless, 
the law is unequivocal that such an intent must be expressed clearly and explicitly. While 
the intent behind the 1954 Act has been clearly manifest in its execution, that intent is 
anything but clear or explicit in the Act itself. Because the intent to eliminate the Uintah 
Band is not so stated in the Act, the Act could do nothing more than expel the Uintah 
Band from the Ute Tribe. Inasmuch as the 1954 Act made no mention whatsoever of the 
pre-existing rights of the Indians of Utah Territory, of Shoshone Indians, nor of the 
Uintah Band, it can have no effect on rights deriving from those sources. 
H. Defendants were denied due process of law 
Throughout the proceedings, the Defendants were denied due process of law. In 
the proceedings pertaining to the jurisdiction of the State, the trial court reversed the 
burden of proof in two critical respects, then refused to acknowledge that the State had 
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failed to meet even this drastically reduced burden. Having found jurisdiction notwith-
standing the applicable federal rulings, the trial court then prohibited the Defendants jfrom 
presenting any defense as to intent. This consistent refusal to abide by both State and 
federal rulings manifested a profound and abiding prejudice on the part of the trial judge. 
A. The Defendants were denied due process in the jurisdiction proceedings. 
In Utah, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law for the court prior to trial. 
U.CA. §76-1-201(5), State v.Pavne. 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995). It is clearly estabUshed 
that when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the burden of proof is upon the State 
to establish jurisdiction. State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah App. 1988). To shift 
"the burden of proof on the fact of jurisdiction to defendant [is] in violation of the due 
process clause of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution." State v. SorensotL 758 P.2d at 470. 
1. The burden of proof was improperly shifted to the Defendants. The same trial 
judge who emphatically stated that he is not bound by federal law then stated: 
"Federal statutes do no address the issue of who has the burden to 
prove that a defendant (or victim) is an Indian or that the crime occurred in 
'Indian Country.' The Utah Appellate Court in Hagen stated: 'The State 
properly concedes that the prosecution was required to prove jurisdiction, 
i.e., that defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a preponderance of 
evidence." 
Reber 262. He then drew a distinction between personal and territorial jurisdiction 
that is not warranted by any of the cited cases, making the remarkable statement that 
"personal jurisdiction is not an element of an offense and need not be proven as such-" 
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For that matter, neither is territorial jurisdiction. The fact is, jurisdiction is an essential 
element of every offense, whether personal or territorial. By what reasoning the court 
concluded that it could proceed without establishing subject matter jurisdiction is not 
reflected in the record. 
The court then relied on an unpublished opinion to conclude that it could place the 
burden of proof on the Defendants. Reber 262. Rule 4-605 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration states: "Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential 
value and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of 
applying the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel." (Emphasis 
added). The mandate in Hagen (Utah App. 1990) is unambiguous. The State bears the 
burden to disprove Indian status. This is the law which is binding on the trial court and 
which should have been applied. 
2. The Defendants were improperly prohibited from presenting evidence of their 
Indian status. Having placed the burden upon the Defendants to establish their Indian 
status, the court then refused to accept any evidence of that status. Initially, the State 
recognized the obligation to propound evidence, and made a motion to that effect to the 
court. Reber 42-44. Indeed, once the court placed the burden of proof on the Defendants, 
it was the Defendant's prerogative to determine the terms and scope of that Indian status. 
321-322, Atkins 163> Thunehorst 162. However, no sooner had the court placed that 
burden on the Defendants then it undertook to define those parameters itself 580, pp. 15-
16, 26,27-28; 581, pp. 7-8. It carefully determined which evidence it would accept in 
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order to defeat Indian status "as a matter of law'9 and refused to permit any other. Thus, 
the court's emphasis on "blood quantum/' to the absolute exclusion of the most decisive 
factor, tribal recognition. No evidentiary hearing was ever held, the court choosing 
instead to simply inquire as to blood quantum and parental status. In effect, the court 
selected evidence in support of a pre-detertoined legal outcome (581, p. 14), an outcome 
which, as shown by the entirety of this brief, was neither the applicable law nor the law 
argued by either of the parties. 579, p. 3-4, 13-15; 580, p. 9; 581, p. 20. The Defendants 
were thus denied their day in court as to their Indian status. This is the very definition of 
denying due process. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.. 446 U.S. 243, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613, 
64LJEd.2dl82(1980). 
3. The State failed to rebut the Defendants' prima facie case. Throughout the 
proceedings in the trial court, the Defendants made more than sufficient allegations to 
establish at least prima facie that they were Indians and that they were on Indian land. 
They did this notwithstanding they had no legal obligation to do so. Procedurally, the 
burden upon the State was to present a preponderance of evidence sufficient to refute 
these allegations. Hagen (Utah App. 1990). Not only did it never do so, it was never even 
called upon to do so. Nor was the burden complex or abstract. In regard to the Indian 
status of the locations where the alleged offenses took place, the procedure had been 
explicitly laid out by the 10th Circuit in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah: The State must conduct 
a title search. 114 F.3d 1513, 1517. The State never did so, and the Defendants were 
prohibited by the trial court from introducing evidence that they had done so. 264. 
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In regard to the Defendants' Indian status, the Defendants made it very clear 
precisely which allegations the State would have had to refute. This was not a question of 
challenging the State to prove an abstract negative. The State would have had to show 
that the Indians of Utah Territory associated with the Uintah Band are set the Indians 
covered by the Act of May 5, 1864, or that the Uintah Band does not exist, or that the 
Defendants are not recognized as Indians by the Uintah Band. While the State's failure to 
do so certainly serves to verify the Defendants' position, the relevance procedurally is 
that the State never even made the attempt. It never called a single witness, nor even 
responded to the Defendants' allegations. And yet, the trial court found that the State had 
proven jurisdiction! With what facts, the record does not show. 264. 
The only argument the State did present was that the Defendants had failed to 
make a prima facie showing, after the trial court had denied them an evidentiary hearing. 
Such a convoluted proceeding is precisely what this Court regarded as the denial of due 
process that results by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant State v. Sorenson. 
758 P.2d 466,470 (Utah App. 1988). 
4, Tribal status determines individual Indian status. As noted in Argument I.C.5., 
above, Indian tribes determine their own membership criteria. By ignoring this, the trial 
court deprived the Defendants of procedural due process. The Defendants were exercis-
ing a tribal right, for which they were being called into question in a State court. The first 
jurisdictional question was thus whether or not the tribal right existed. The 10* Circuit 
had already stated in Conway that the tribal right would exist for somebody, as a matter 
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of law, if the facts should be proven as alleged. This left only the factual question, unre-
solved in Conwav. as to whether the Indians of Utah Territoiy associated with the Uintah 
Band are that somebody. This factual question could only be determined by evidence, 
evidence which the Defendants were more than ready, willing, and able to present, and 
which the trial court absolutely refused to hear, or later, allow the jury to hear. 321-323; 
584, pp. 8-10, 16-18, 20, 21-23, 26-28, 168-169, 17M75, 182-187, 192-195. 
Instead, the court took it upon itself to make a determination that could only b$ 
made by the Uintah Band, namely, who is and who is not a member of that tribe. Before 
the court could indulge in speculations under the cited Rogers test, it had to necessarily 
assume that there is no Uintah Band, or that the Uintah Band has no rights under 
Conway, or that the Defendants are not members of that tribe. Otherwise, the Rogers test 
is irrelevant, inasmuch as the applicable test under Hagen asks first whether the defendant 
is recognized as a member by a tribe or band of Indians. 
Had the court in fact taken evidence and made a determination that the Uintah 
Band are not Indians covered by the Act of May 5,1864, and are therefore not the 
Indians referred to in the Conway ruling, there might have been some justification in 
proceeding to the Rogers test. But the court did none of this. It simply usuiped a function 
which both state and federal law makes clear is reserved to the Uintah Band. It also, by 
implication, made a factual finding against the Uintah Band for which it had received no 
facts. This procedural reversal proved to be more severe in its consequences than merely 
reversing the burden of proof. Both reversals deprived the Defendants of due process of 
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law, and require that the convictions be vacated. 
B. The Defendants were entitled to present evidence as to Mistake of Law under 
U.C.A. $76-2-304. 
U.C.A. §76-2-304 states in pertinent part: 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a 
penal law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably 
believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a 
written order or grant of permission by an administrative 
agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an 
opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant 
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in 
question. 
UCA. §76-2-308 states: "Defenses enumerated in this part [§76-2-301 et seq.] 
constitute affirmative defenses." U.C.A. §76-1-504 states: "Evidence of an affirmative 
defense as defined by this code or other statutes shall be presented by the defendant/' 
(Emphasis added). 
The elements of the affirmative defense of Mistake of Law are: 
L The defendant acted out of mistake or ignorance of the law; 
2. The mistake or ignorance was based on a reasonable reliance; 
3. The reliance was upon a written statement of the law; 
4. The written statement of the law was either: 
a, an order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by 
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law with interpreting the law; or 
b. a published court opinion. 
The defense of reasonable reliance upon a court ruling, a factual issue, should not 
be confused with the legal issue of law of the case. "Under the law of the case doctrine, a 
decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the 
same litigation." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center. Inc.. 70 P.3d 904, 912 
(2000). The trial court's rulings as to State jurisdiction and the Defendants' Indian status 
constituted the "law of the case" until sentencing. Within the narrow context of the trial 
court, this established that the Defendants' reliance on the 10& Circuit rulings constituted 
a "mistake." However, this is an entirely separate matter from the factual issue of whether 
the Defendants were reasonable in believing otherwise. 
The defense of mistake of law is based on the due process clause contained in the 
V* and XIVth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Cox v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 559, 571, 
85 S.Ct 476,484,13 L.Ed. 487 (1965); Bouie v. Citv of Columbia. 378 U.S. 347,354, 
84 S.Ct 1697,1703, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). The right to due process of law includes the 
right to reasonably rely upon a published interpretation of the law. United States v. 
Caceres. 440 U.S. 741, 753 n.15, 99 S.Ct 1465, 1472 n. 15, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979). This 
specifically includes the right to rely on rulings issued by the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals. United States v.Peltier. 422 U.S. 531,541-542, 95 S.Ct 2313,2319-2320,45 
L.Ed.2d 374 (1975). "Unless we are to hold that parties may not reasonably rely upon any 
legal pronouncement emanating from sources other than this Court, we cannot regard as 
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blameworthy those parties who conform their conduct to the prevailing [federal] statutory 
or constitutional norm.9' Id. 
Likewise, under Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution, defendants are entitled to 
present evidence of the interpretation of the law they have relied upon. South Salt Lake 
Cityv, Terkelson. 61 P.3d 282,285 (Utah App. 2002). Under Utah law, this is so even if 
the interpretation they have relied upon is not binding ypon the court. It is a denial of 
Due Process to prevent defendants from presenting such evidence, particular if that 
interpretation was in the form of a judicial ruling. 61 P.3d at 286, See also United States 
v. Brady. 710 F.Supp. 290,294-295 (D.Colo. 1989). The defense of mistake of law is 
based on fundamental fairness. Kipp v. State. 704 A.2d 839, 843 (Del 1998). 
1. Prohibiting the presentation of evidence prejudiced the Defendants, There is no 
question that the rulings of the 10th Circuit in Ute Tribe v. Utah and Conway constitute 
published court rulings within the meaning of U.C.A. §76-2-304(2)(bXii). They are in 
writing, as required in order to invoke the defense. State v. Norton, 67 P.3d 1050,1053 
(Utah App. 2003). They are also issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Gallegos v. 
State. 828 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex.App. Houston 1st Dist. 1992)(Mistake of law must be 
based on a court ruling). "The right to rely upon a judicial declaration of the law is free 
from question if the decision is by the highest court in the jurisdiction/' Ignorance or 
Mistake of Law Revisited-1980 Utah L.Rev* 473,487, Rollin M. Perkins. State v. 
O'Neil 147 Iowa 513,126 N.W. 454,457 (Iowa 1910). Likewise, the written 
proclamations of the Ute Tribe, the written opinion of the Solicitor General of the United 
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States, as well as the declarations of Uintah elders, constitute orders or grants of 
permission by administrative agencies charged with interpreting the law within the 
meaning of U.C.A. §76-2-304(2)(b)(i). All of these were relied upon in good faith by the 
Defendants. None were admitted into evidence. 319-323; Atkins 162-165; Thunehorst 
161464; 584, pp. 21-23. 
The Defendants attempted to present the testimony of Randy Simmons, the Uintah 
County Recorder, to demonstrate that the locations in question were within the exterior 
boundaries of the reservation, and that those locations had never been homesteads or 
townsites under the 1902-1905 Acts of Congress. They would have shown thereby that 
they were reasonable in believing that they were within Indian country as defined by the 
10th Circuit in Ute Tribe v. Utah. The trial court excluded this evidence. The court 
likewise excluded John Reber's testimony that he and Rick Reber were Indians hunting 
on Indian land, and that they did rely on the 10th Circuit's ruling. 584, pp. 182-187. 
The Defendants also attempted to present numerous witnesses and substantial 
evidence that they are Indians to whom apply the Act of May 5, 1864, as stated by the 
10th Circuit in Conway, This included testimony by tribal members, including the 
Defendants, as to the current customs and traditions of the Indians of Utah Territory, as 
well as extensive testimony by tribal elders and historians as to the continued and 
separate existence of the Uintah Band from historical times to the present. They also 
attempted to present a law professor from the University of Utah with renowned expertise 
in Indian affairs to explain the place of federal rulings within Indian culture. The 
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substance of the proffered testimony is described at 305-309, 354-356, 504, Atkins 73-92, 
Thunehorst 74-103. When presented with this evidence, the jury would have been able to 
determine whether the Defendants were reasonable in relying upon the 10th Circuit's 
ruling in Conway. Instead, the trial court ruled it all irrelevant! 319-323; Atkins 162-165; 
Thunehorst 161-164; 584, p. 28, lines 14-16: "In this case I've ruled that as a matter of 
law no reasonable jury could rely upon that in supporting the defense or raising the 
defense." 
Rick Reber requested a minimum 3-day trial in order to properly present mis 
evidence to the jury. 582, p. 4. The court denied this. When the court demonstrated mat it 
would go so far as to exclude the police reports of the arresting officers (584, p. 10), it 
became apparent to Mr. Atkins and Mr. Thunehorst that a trial on their separate charges 
would be futile. 
In essence, the Defendants were prevented from presenting any defense at all. 
There can be no question that they were prejudiced by this exclusion. 
2. Reasonableness is a question of fact for the jury. Reasonableness is a question 
of fact. Texas v. P.Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. 162 U.S. 197,238,16 
S.Ct 666,682,40 L.Ed. 940 (1896); Pennsylvania Co. v. United States. 236 U.S. 351, 
361,35 S.Ct 370,373,59 L.Ed. 616 (1915). As a question of fact, reasonableness is me 
exclusive province of the jury. State v. Cravens. 15 P.3d 635, 639 (Utah App. 2000). 
"Defendant's intent, or purpose, is a fact for the determination of the jury." State v. 
Brown. 607 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1980). "Questions of intent are strictly within the 
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province of the jury/' State V. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 660 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied 
843 P.2d 1042. See also State v. John, 586 P.2d 410,412 (Utah 1978). "If there be a 
basis for reasonable men to disagree it should be submitted to the jury." Holmes v. 
Nester. 81 Ariz. 372, 306 P.2d 290, 293, 62 ALR2d 1322, 1327 (1957). 
Contrary to the foregoing, the trial court held that the Defendants' reliance upon 
the rulings of the 10th Circuit, the proclamations of the Ute Tribe, and the advice of their 
own tribal elders could not be reasonable as a matter of law, 319-323, There is simply no 
law to support this argument. Reasonableness is a question of fact. 
3. Defendants were entitled to jury instructions as to reasonable reliance and 
Mistake of Law. U.C. A. §76-1-501(1) states: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent 
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be 
acquitted. 
U.C.A. §76-1-502 states in pertinent part: 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the 
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative defense. 
Prior to trial, Rick Reber submitted proposed jury instructions based upon U.C.A. 
§§76-2-304(2)(b) 76-2-308, and 76-1-502. Reber 428-44L These instructions were 
prepared in anticipation that some amount of evidence of would be introduced as to his 
own Indian status and the Indian status of the location of the alleged offense. The jury is 
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entitled to a clear instruction setting forth the burden of proof on an affirmative defense. 
State v.Torres. 619 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980). 
The State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of an affirmative 
defense placed in evidence. The burden on the defendant is very low. Mullaney v. 
Wilbur. 4ll U.S. 684, 700-701, 95 S.Ct 1881, 1890-1891, 44 L.Ed.2d 580, 520-521 
(1975). Utah follows the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mullaney v. Wilbur. State v, 
SwensoiL 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992), Thus, evidence of an affirmative defense 
does not even have to be a preponderance. State v. Knoll 712 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1985). 
On the other hand, the State must still overcome an affirmative defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt State v. Garcia, 18 P.3d 1123, 1127 (Utah App. 2001). The trial court 
must clearly convey to the jury that the State has the counter-intuitive burden to disprove 
an affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt State v. Garcia. 18 P.3d 1123,1128 
(Utah App. 2001). The proposed jury instructions would have accomplished this purpose. 
Indeed, in the early stages of the case, the State acknowledged that it had the burden to 
overcome an affirmative defense of tribal right. 579, p, 24. 
Essentially, the only evidence the jury was allowed to hear was that John Reber, 
the Defendant's brother, was bom in an Indian hospital. 584, p. 180. John Reber did 
testify at length about his own and his brother's Indian status, and their belief that they 
were on Indian land. However, the court did not allow the jury to hear even this small 
amount of evidence. 584, p. 182-187. This was only a fraction of the extensive testimony 
the Defendants attempted to introduce. 305-309; 354-356; Atkins 73-92, Thunehorst 74-
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103; 504, Nevertheless, it would have been sufficient to require that the jury receive the 
proposed instructions. It was error by the court to exclude this testimony, and it was error 
to exclude the proposed jury instructions. 
C The Defendants were prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge. 
The Uintah people have had extensive experience in trying to obtain justice 
through Judge Payne. This Court was apprized of his bias in the previous case of State v. 
Valdez. Case No. 20010146-CA. In that case, the sole issue was the defendant's Indian 
status, the State having stipulated that the alleged offense took place on Indian land. Mr. 
Valdez is recognized by the federal government as an Indian. The evidence, some of 
which was elicited by Judge Payne himself, demonstrated that Mr. Valdez was 15/16 
Indian by lineage. Nevertheless, the judge refused to recognize Mr. Valdez as an Indian 
on the sole ground that he was an Indian of Utah associated with the Uintah Band. As 
noted in the recusal affidavit subsequently filed in the Reber case, even the Attorney 
General's office was a bit astonished at this ruling. 
Mr. Reber presumed throughout the jurisdiction proceedings that even Judge 
Payne would be compelled to abide by the law and evidence presented by the defense. It 
was only when it became apparent the extent to which these arguments would not prevail 
that Mr. Reber moved for Judge Payne to be disqualified. The grounds for that 
disqualification are set forth in detail at Reber 280-292. Mr. Atkins and Mr. Thunehorst 
concluded that they could not get fair trials, and entered pleas to expedite this appeal. 
The true measure of prejudice on the part of the trial judge may best be expressed 
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by the variance between the trial court's rulings and the facts and law presented in 
opposition to those rulings. But for the trial judge's clear bias against all Indians of Utah 
Territory, it is apparent that the proceedings in the trial court would have taken an 
entirely different course. Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 38 P.3d 984,992 (Utah 
App. 2001). See also Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1)(a). The verdicts against 
the Defendant's should be vacated. If they are to be tried at all, they should be tried in an 
impartial forum with proper jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The State lacks jurisdiction to try the Defendants. The matter is governed by 
federal law. The court held it isn't. The Defendants were on Indian land. The court held 
they weren't. They are Indians. The court held they aren't. They are members of the 
Uintah Band. The court refused to even address the existence of the Uintah Band. They 
possess hunting and fishing rights. The court held they don't. Their rights are unaffected 
by the Ute Partition Act. The court extended the reach of this unconstitutional act when it 
had no jurisdiction to do so. The court erred on numerous points, any one of which alone 
would have been sufficient to defeat jurisdiction. As it was, the court erred on all of them. 
Inasmuch as the court, as well as the State, lacked jurisdiction, the convictions of the 
Defendants should be vacated and the cases dismissed. 
The Defendants were also denied due process at every opportunity. They were 
required to prove Indian status, rather than have that status disproven by the State. They 
were then prohibited from proving that status. Having nevertheless alleged such status, 
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the State was completely absolved from proving jurisdiction at all. Having alleged 
membership in a tribe and proffered proof of the tribe's status, the court undertook to 
overrule the tribe's determination by ignoring the tribe's existence entirely. 
Assuming arguendo that the State had jurisdiction, the Defendants were at least 
entitled under explicit state law and federal rulings to have a jury determine whether they 
were reasonable in believing they were Indians and in believing they were on Indian land. 
Even this was denied them. The effect of the judge's bias could not be more evident. 
At every turn, the Defendants were denied due process. In effect, they never had 
their day in court, notwithstanding they were in a courthouse, going through the motions 
of a trial. Any one of these errors would be sufficient to warrant a new trial. Cumulative-
ly, there can be no other conclusion than to vacate the convictions and remand the matters 
for a fair trial before an impartial judge. This Court should so order. 
DATED this 5* day of Januaiy, 2005, 
Michael L. Humisron 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : RULING 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
RICKIE L. REBER, : Case No.: 021800320 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court on June 3, 2003 for hearing. At the hearing the 
parties stipulated that: 
1. The Defendant's mother carried 1/8 "Indian Blood", and was named on the 
Termination Proclamation in 1961.1 
2. The Defendant's father does not have any "Indian Blood". 
3. The Defendant is 15/16 non-Indian by blood and 1/16 Indian by blood. 
4. The Defendant is not a member of any Indian Tribe recognized as a Tribe by 
the United States Government. 
5. The Defendant is 51 years old. He was born in Roosevelt and lived in 
Lapoint, Utah until he was 22. He has not lived in Indian Country since he was 22. 
6. The Defendant does not now claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos 
Tribe". 
7. The Defendant does not maintain that the permit which he produced when he 
1
 In 1954 Congress passed the Ute Termination Act, August 27, 1954, Ch 1009, 68 State 
868, which is now found at 25 U.S.C. 677. "The Termination Proclamation, contemplated by 
Section 23 of the "Act", 25 U.S.C. Section 677v., was issued and published by the Secretary 
effective at midnight August 27, 1961. 26 Fed. Reg. 8042." Affiliated Utes v. United States 406 
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was first contacted by law enforcement is valid. He does maintain that, at that time, he 
believed that the permit was valid. 
This Court is bound by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perank. 858 
P.2d 927 and Hagenv. Utah. 510 U.S. 399. Each of these cases held that the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation has been diminished and that there is no outer 
boundary to the reservation. The United States Supreme Court noted: "The operative 
language of the 1902 Act provided for allocations of reservation land to Indians, and that all 
the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain". (At 
412)..."It follows that when lands so reserved were 'restored' to the public domain - - i.e., 
once again opened to sale or settlement- - their previous public use was extinguished" (at 412). 
The Court then noted that when lands were returned to public domain, this stripped the land of 
reservation status (at p412). Finally the Court indicated that "our cases considering operative 
language of restoration have uniformly equated it with a congressional purpose to terminate 
reservation status." (at p. 413). Finally the Court held: "In light of our precedents, we hold 
that the restoration of unallotted reservation lands to the public domain evidences a 
congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsistent with the continuation of 
reservation status." 
Federal law defines Indian Country to include land within: Indian Reservations, 
dependent Indian Communities, and Indian Allotments. 18 U.S.C. 1151 (a), (b),(c). Federal 
case law also reserves jurisdiction of crimes which occur within "Indian Country" involving an 
Indian as a victim to the tribes or the Federal Government. 18 U.S.C. 1152; Duro v. Reina. 
495 U.S. 676. However, State Courts have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes which occur 
within Indian Country where the defendant and victim are not Indian. Williams v. U.S.. 327 
U.S. 711; State v. Roedh 155 P.2d 741 (Utah 1945). Federal Statutes do not define "Indian" 
for criminal jurisdictional purposes. In United States v. Rogers. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-
73 (1846), the United States Supreme Court suggested two, factors to be evaluated in 
determining who is an Indian: (1) Whether the individual has a significant degree of Indian 
blood; and (2) Whether the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a tribe, or society 
of Indians, or by the Federal Government. The Rogers test for determining Indian status has 
been adopted by the Utah Appellate and Supreme Courts. State of Utah v. Hagen. 802 P2d 
745, 748 (Ut. App. Ct. 1990); State of Utah v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927; 932 (Ut. S. CT., 
1992). Until the Utah Supreme Court announces a new standard, this Court is bound by the 
Hagen 
2 
and Perank cases. Therefore, this Court will follow the Rogers test in determining whether 
the Defendant is an Indian. Any argument that Utah should follow the test announced in 
Lapiervs, McCormick. 986 F,2d 303 should be addressed to the Supreme Court.2 
Federal statutes do not address the issue ol who has the burden to prove that a 
defendant (or victim) is an Indian or that the crime occurred in "Indian Country". The ! ":ih 
Appellate Court in Hagen stated: "The State properly concedes that the prosecution was 
required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a 
preponderance of evidence." The Hagen Court cited State v. Sorensom 758 P.2d 466, 469-
470, as authority for the proposition that the State had the burden of showing that a defendant 
was not an Indian. However, the issue in Sorenson concerned territorial rather than personal 
jurisdiction. While territorial jurisdiction must be proved by I he State by a preponderance of 
evidence in every criminal case (State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032) personal jurisdiction is not an 
element of an offense and need not be proved as such. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has 
not been consistent in requiring the State prove an individual is not an Indian. In an 
unpublished opinion (State v. Lucero, Case No. 860213 - Ca) a different panel of the 
Appellate Court held: "...Appellant had the burden to persuade the trial Court that he was an 
'Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. Section 1152-53." More importantly, our 
Supreme Court has indicated: "On these facts, we conclude that Perank carried his burden of 
factually establishing that he has been 'recognized racially' as a Ute Indian." Perank at 933. 
Given the fact that the Perank decision is the most recent appellate decision and that it is the 
opinion of our Supreme Court, this Court is bound to follow that decision. Therefore, 
although the State bears the burden of showing that the offense occurred within the boundaries 
of the State of Utah and Uintah County, the defendant has the burden to show, by a 
2Some have argued that Indian status, lot the purposes ol determining Federal jui isdietion 
nuclei Section 1152 and 1153 should be based entirely upon membership in a Federally 
recognized Indian Tribe. This test would allow Indians to make then own determination of 
"Indian" status. Reliance upon tribal membership would also provide an understandable and 
workable standard. It would avoid consideration of such subjective and transitory issues as self-
concept as being Indian and recognition as being Indian within Indian Society. It further avoids 
the quagmire encountered in making a determination ol "Indian" status based upon Federal 
recognition. Federal Statutes and Regulations which define "Indian" are inconsistent and 
confusing. Individuals are defined as "Indian" for some purposes and programs, but are not 
defined as "Indian" for other purposes and programs. Where an individual comes within some, 
but not all, federal definitions, where does the Court draw the line in determining "Indian" status 
Is it sufficient if an individual meets at least one federal definition, or must he be recognized 
within "most" definitions; or perhaps he must meet all federal definitions of "Indian" A 
definition of "Indian" for the purpose of applying section 1152 which relies upon membership in 
a Federally recognized Indian tribe provide a much more workable standard than the test set forth 
in Hagen Nevertheless, most courts who have considered this issue have adopted the Hagen 
test 
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preponderance of evidence, that he is an "Indian" under the Rogers test. 
Placing the burden on the defendant is consistent with what two Courts have 
characterized as the majority position of courts which have addressed the issue. Arizona v. 
Verdugo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (1995 Ariz. App. Ct); Vermont v. St. Francis. 563 A.2d 249. 
This is consistent with case law in: Arizona (Verdugo): Vermont (St. Francis): New Mexico 
(State of New Mexico v. Cutnose. 532 P.2d 896, (N.M. App. 1974)); Nevada (State of 
Nevada v. Jack. 96 P.497 (1908)); Pendleton v. Sate of Nevada 734 P.2d 693 (1987); 
Oklahoma (State of Oklahoma v. Klindt. 782 P.2d 401, (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Washington 
(State of Washington v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650) and with sound public policy, "...the general 
rule is that the State has subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its territorial 
border. ...As an exception to that general rule, however, the Indian Country Crimes Act 
preempts State Court jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution when an offense involving an 
Indian occurs on Indian land...The federal statute is silent, however, on the issue of who bears 
the burden of proof to establish these jurisdictional facts." Verdugo at 1167. The Arizona 
Appellate Court then noted that while the State bears the burden to show the offense occurred 
within State boundaries, the elements of a criminal offense do not require the State to prove 
that the crime did not involve an Indian. The Court notes that to require the State to prove 
that the defendant and the victim were not Indian would place "...the state...in a position of 
having to prove the nonoccurence of events which might deprive it of jurisdiction." (Verdugo 
at 1168). The court went on to note: "If we were to place this burden on the state, the state 
would be compelled to allege...every conceivable exception to State Court jurisdiction." 
(Verdugo at 1168). Not only would the state be required to allege every exception to 
jurisdiction, the state would have the affirmative burden to prove that die exception did not 
apply. 
Wigmore suggest that in determining \yho should bear the burden of proof it is 
appropriate to consider that it is difficult to prove the nonexistence of a fact and it is 
appropriate to place the burden on the party who presumably has particular means of 
knowledge.) Wigmore. Evidence in Trials at Common Law §2486 (1981). It is therefore 
relevant that there are over three hundred Indian Tribes which have been recognized by the 
Federal Government. Membership in any one of these tribes would be sufficient to meet the 
second test as set forth in Rogers (i.e. that the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a 
tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal Government). In addition to Federally 
recognized tribes there are many more Indian groups or societies of Indians which may form 
the basis to establish the second test in Rogers. It would therefore be virtually impossible for 
the state to prove that a particular individual was not a member of any of the possible tribes 
and Indian societies throughout the United States. Additionally, in many cases it would be 
impossible to prove that a particular person did not have a significant degree of Indian blood 
(which is the first test under Rogers). While it may be possible to determine the identity of a 
defendant's parents it may be impossible to prove that the parents do not have Indian blood. 
In the case of adopted persons, it would often be impossible to determine that the biological 
parents were not Indian. This becomes even more difficult as you consider whether 
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grandparents and great grandparents (who may be deceased) have Indian blood. All of this is 
complicated by the liberal interpretation courts have given to the term significant degree of 
Indian blood. Generally twenty-five percent is considered substantial, It is obvious that, the 
information which is relevant to a defendant's blood lines as well as his or her associations 
with Indian Tribes and societies, is uniquely within the knowledge of the Defendant and is 
usually readily available to the Defendant, while such information is often unavailable to the 
State. 
One must also remember that under 1151 the state is deprived of jurisdiction when a 
victim is an Indian. If the state bears the burden of proof, the state must show that each victim 
in every case is not an Indian. In most cases this could be easily accomplished by asking the 
victim a few simple questions during trial. However, noi all victims are available to be 
examined at trial. Victims move and sometimes can not be k*. a*ed. Victims may die prior to 
trial. By definition, a victim in a homicide would never be available to testify concerning their 
blood lines or association with Indian Tribes and societies. Because Indian status may depend 
on association with Indian tribes, culture, and society, it would often be difficult to prove that 
a victim who is not present at trial was not an Indian. Occasionally, it is not possible for the 
State to even identify the victim by name. (One of the cases cited above (Jack) involved a 
victim of a homicide who was "commonly known by the name 'Lotta', whose real name was 
to the grand jury unknown." (P 497). If the State were required to prove that it has 
jurisdiction by disproving Indian status of each victim, there would be certain cases wheie the 
victim's status as an non-Indian could never be proved. By placing the burden on the State, 
this Court would be depriving the State of jurisdiction merely because the State has no access 
*o the kind of information necessary to prove Indian status under Rogers. 
Considering all of the circumstances and public poiic> ,;\c Din Jon r- properly placed 
upon the defendant to show an exception 10 state jurisdiction by establishing a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant or \ iclim has a significant decree oi' Indian blood and has 
been recognized as an Indian bv an Indian Tribe, or socien of Indians. o\ ;;y the Federal 
Government. * 
DATED this J day of fane, 2003. 
A, I YNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRK T COURT c0u^p0^r 
COIJNTY OF ITINTAH, STATI (M I T \II % ^ * ^ ^ 4tyy 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
it ^ M I K i . b k K . , 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 021800320 FS 
" I "his Court ha;-
Motion to Disqualify. 
icaiioii iroin the trial tourt judge the Defendant's 
After folly reviewing the file, and within the provisions of Rule 29(c)(2) U.R.Cr.P., the 
Court finds that based upon the allegations supported by affidavit for the Motion to Disqualify 
that bias and prejudice, if any; that is alleged was known by the affiants prior to the court's ruling 
on the question of jurisdiction. Since Rule 29(c) requires the motion to disqualify to be filed at 
least within 20 days of (a) the assignment of the action or hearing to the judge, (b) the appearance 
of the party or the party's attorney, or (c) the date on which the moving party learns or with 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is 
based are all adequately and woefully late. The parties in this case have adequately and 
knowledgeably presented the arguments for determining jurisdiction when the Defendant has 
claimed to be an Indian. Those matters have been adequately briefed, well argued, and the trial 
court.'s ruling seems to be well supported in the case law. 
It would seem that the Defendant has waited to disqualify the judge i. 
months after this case was filed when he obtained an unfavorably ruling. The 
will be returned to the trial judge. The Motion to Disqualify is hereby denied. 
. i i ' v e n 
} J U T 
D A T E D this K-:' -bl> nl'NnviMnb. • 
RT: 
John R. Anderson 
Eighth District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of November, 2003, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Ruling was mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to the following: Edwin T. 
Peterson, Attorney for the State, 152 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; and to Michael L. 
Humiston, Attorney for the Defendant, P.O. Box 486, Heber pity/Utah 84032. 
J! In 
Deputy Court Clerk 
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR I IINTAH rnTTVTY 
S' M! < • : RULING AND ORDER 
Planum, 
vs. 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant. 
iiic Court has reuci\ed and ic\ ie\vea tne Defendant's objections to the State's proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. After reviewing the proposed order and the 
Defendant's objections, the Order will be modified as follows: 
1. The third sentence of paragraph four will be modi lied to read: Mr. Reber's 
mother, and the grandmother of Mr. Thiiiiehorst and Mr. Atkins, were listed *>n ihe 
termination proclamation. Their status as Indians was therefore terminated by the Ute 
Partition Act of 1994, 35 U.S.C. §677 et seg. (Hereinafer the "IJPA"). The paragraph v.., 
continue starting with the fourth sentence of paragraph 4. 
i „i ioiiou iiig language win oe deleted from the second sentence of paragraphs 1,2, 
and 3: "facts, if proved correct wo"i*! create original jurisdid • * \ in die Federal Courts." 
3. Line 2 of paragraph 10 will be modified by striking "he was" ami substituting llu'v 
WVYV " - ' • . . 
4. The last line of paragraph :_ - : • . :<; ' .ompietion of IJPA" and 
substituting "terminalson proclamation". 
5. Line 4 of the second paragraph of the conclusions of law will be modified by 
adding the word "of1 between the w~"dv "^wer" .nni "fongres1-". 
1, The Court has made several grammatical changes ^ * r> sed order. 
1 :iesc changes will be made b: ihe propo>ed ordei. 
/. Paragraph ^ oi ihe v UHOIUMOIKS of Law will be modified by adding the following 
sentence to the end of the paragraph' "IV. MIK.> iii^e "vi;virluals were not tribal members they 
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could not have been listed on the termination proclamation. Nevertheless, their immediate 
ancestors were members of the tribe whose Indian Status was terminated." 
8. The last paragraph of the Conclusions of Law will be modified by deleting the first 
sentence and adding an additional sentence as follows: "All Motions with respect to claims that 
the Court does not have jurisdiction which are based upon claims that the defendants are 
Indians are denied." 
DATED this_/^_day of January, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the /^^day of January, 2004, true and correct copies of the 
Rulmg and Order were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Edwin T. Peterson, 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr. Michael L. 




EDWIN T. PETERSON(#3849) 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 





^ 2 9 2004 
^OANNRMoKEE, CLERK 
vw 
INTHbDISTRICI Col IK !TOR 11 If1 hKillTI! JphKIAl DISTRICT 





MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONC1 'MON^'OI' I, U\ 
Case No. 021800320-
avne 
1 he Cuun. iia\ mg previously entered written findings c)o this matter, adoj 
findings herein and IIMUS ihrilu'i finding uiTiul and conclusions of law, based upon the 
stipulations of the parties as follows: 
,.[)£PI t-r^ 
1. Defendant Rickie L. Reber is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife", a third degree felony, for allegedly assisting his 
son in taking a trophy buck deer without the appropriate permit from, the area 
known as the "Book Cliffs'* in southern Uintah County. Mr. Reber initially 
moved to dismiss the criminal charges claiming to be a member of the 
"Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area the alleged act occurred was in 
"Indian Country'. Mr. Reber, in the course of the litigation, abandoned his 
claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is 
a member of the "Uintah Band' Vand is of either Shoshone or Ute decent. 
2. Defendant Steven Paul i imuciiorst is charged with "aiding or assisting in the 
wanton destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly 
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area 
known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern 
Uintah County. Mr. Thunehorst initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges 
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area 
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Thunehorst, in the course 
of the litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos 
Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of 
either Shoshone or Ute decent. 
3. Defendant Tex William Atkins is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly 
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area 
known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern 
Uintah County. Mr. Atkins initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges 
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area 
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Atkins, in the course of the 
litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe", 
affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either 
Shoshone or Ute decent. 
4 With respect to Mr. Reber, it was stipulated by the parties that he claimed to be 
1/16th Indian by blood, from his mother. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. 
Atkins it was stipulated by the parties that they claim to be 1/16th Indian by 
blood, from their grandmother. Mr. Reber's mother, and the grandmother of Mr. 
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were listed on the termination proclamation. Their 
status as Indians was therefore terminated by the Ute Partition act of 1954, 25 
U.S.C. sec 677 et seq. (Hereinafter the "UPA). Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins 
may have a grandparent who had Indian blood but was not a member of a tribe 
which was recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs as an Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of 
Indian affairs by virtue of their status as Indian tribe. Mr. Thunehorst and Mr. 
Atkins have not produced evidence of the heritage of this person. 
5 Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins are not members of any Indian tribe 
recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs as an 
Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of Indian affairs by 
virtue of their status as Indian tribe. 
6 Mr. Reber is 51 years old, or was at the time of this Courts last ruling. 
7 Mr. Reber was born in Roosevelt Utah and lived in Lapoint Utah until he was 22. 
8 Mr. Reber has not lived on or near the Ute Indian Reservation since he was 22. 
9 Mr. Reber does not now claim to be a member of the Timpanogos tribe. 
10 Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins do not now maintain that the permit 
that they produced when they were contacted by law enforcement was valid, but 
do maintain that they believed that the permit was valid at that time of the alleged 
violations. 
11. Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins claim to be members of the "Uintah 
Band", and that is the only group that they claim to be associated with. 
They all maintain that they are Indians of Utah Territory. They do not claim to be 
members of the Ute Indian Tribe, or of the Uintah band of the Ute Indian tribe 
which is one of the three constituent bands which comprise the Ute Indian Tribe. 
12. Mr. Reber was alive in 1961. Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins were born after 
1961, however Mr. Thunehorst's and Mr. Atkin's mothers, who were sisters, were 
alive at the time of the termination proclamation in 1961. 
The Court makes the following conclusions of law. 
With respect to Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, even if the court were to not 
consider the issue of the UPA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 etseq., they do not have significant blood 
quantum under the first prong of the two part analysis stated in United States v. Rogers. 45 U.S. 
(4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846), which was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Perank, 
858 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1992) to be considered an Indian. The Court can find no benefit which 
is available base upon Indian blood quantum of 1/16th. Therefore for the purpose of qualifying 
for Federal programs or recognition they do not qualify based upon their quantum of blood. 
When describing a person as having 1/16 Indian Blood one must realize that necessarily means 
that same person is 15/16 non Indian. That means that he has 6 1/4% Indian blood and 
93 3/4 non Indian blood. This percentage of blood is simply not high enough to meet the first 
prong of the Rogers Test. The Court has found no Federal or State case which determined a 
percentage of Indian blood as low as 6.25 % to be significant under the Rogers Test. There is 
judicial precedence, Vialpando vs Wyoming. 640 P.2d 77, that 12 Vi % was not substantial 
under the Rogers Test. Other case have held that 12 lA % is substantial. This Court is unaware 
of any case which has gone below 12 lA %. The case that held 12 lA % was substantial is Sully 
vs. United States 195 Fed. 2d. 113 which was issued by the 8th Circuit and is an old case. 
Even if Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkin's blood quantum was of a significant 
amount, the Court finds that the UPA terminated their status as an Indian for the purpose of 
criminal jurisdiction. Congress has the plenary power to legislate for Indian tribes in all matters. 
An individuals status as Indian for jurisdictional purposes is subject to the power of Congress to 
allocate jurisdiction between the State, Tribes, and the Federal Government. Congress clearly has 
the unilateral power to grant the State jurisdictions over persons who are Indian.. The statute in 
this case (Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 et seq.) says that upon termination, all statutes of 
the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be 
applicable to such member over which supervision was terminated and the laws of the several 
States shall apply to such member in the same manner as they apply to other citizens within their 
jurisdiction. That provision clearly grants to the State jurisdiction over all persons who are listed 
in the termination proclamation which would include Mr. Reber's mother and Mr. Thunhorst and 
Mr. Atkins' grandmother. Therefore, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, Mr. Reber's 
Mother and Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother are no longer considered to be Indian. 
The natural consequence of termination of these ancestors as Indian is that each of the 
Defendant's would not be considered to have received any Indian blood from, in Mr. Reber's 
case, his mother and in Mr Atkins and Mr. Thunhorst case, their grandmother. 
The Court does not believe that Congress intended to terminate an ancestors status as 
Indian only to continue that relationship with their decedents. 
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction under Rogers Mr. Reber, does not have any 
Indian blood coming through his mother and since this is the only Indian blood which he claims, 
he does not have any Indian blood for the purposes of the Rogers analysis. As for Mr. Thunhorst 
and Mr. Atkins they also have no Indian blood coming from their maternal grandmother. The 
conclusion of this Court is based upon the conclusions of the Federal Court in the Fetter case. 
U.S. v Orrana B. Felter. 546 F.Supp. 1002 (D.C. 1982), affd 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir 1985) and 
the Utah Appellate Court in the Gardner case State v. Gardner, 827 P. 2d 980 (Utah App. 
1992).. 
Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins argue that in spite of the termination of their 
ancestors Indian status, they have not been affected by the UPA; because in Mr. Rebers case he, 
and in Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' case their mother was alive at the time of the UPA. The 
absence of the Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' mother's name, or in Mr. Rebers case his name 
on the termination proclamation is not relevant to this inquiry. It only reflects that at the time of 
the termination act, Mr. Reber and the mothers of Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were not 
enrolled members of the Ute Tribe, and therefore could not be an individual who could receive 
tribal benefits. Because these individuals were not tribal members they could not have been 
listed on the termination proclamation. Nevertheless, their immediate ancestors were members 
of the tribe whose Indian Status was terminated. 
It is clear to the Court that by 1950 all relevant Indian hunting and fishing rights were 
vested in the Ute Indian tribe. No individual had a right to those hunting and fishing rights 
except through the tribe, and through membership in the tribe. Again it is evident to the Court 
that Congress did not intend to terminate Mr. Reber's mothers status as and Indian and Mr. 
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother's status as an Indian, only to recognize their children and 
grandchildren to have Indian hunting rights based upon Indian heritage which was 
Congressionally terminated. The argument that they were not among the 490 individuals listed in 
the UPA is therefore without merit. One is either a member or not. Whether or not they were 
eligible to be an individual who was entitled to membership is not the issue. Before this Court 
can take note of any privilege which is based upon tribal membership, that person must apply for 
and be granted membership by the tribe. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Reber, Mr. 
Thunhorst or Mr. Atkins have ever applied for or been granted membership by the Ute Indian 
Tribe. And there is no indication that Mr. Thunhorst, Mr. Reber or Mr. Atkins has been granted 
any other tribal membership. 
It would be inappropriate for the Court to extend any privilege which is available only 
through membership when the tribe has never granted those privileges through membership. 
Even if a Defendant may have once been eligible for membership that would not be relevant. 
You either are a tribal member or you're not. If you are eligible you need to apply and be granted 
those privileges. The Court was further convinced after reading Judge Jenkins opinion in Felter 
which was the basis for the Murdoch decision, U.Sv. Murdoch, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir 1997), 
that there is a connection. The Court finds that all of those rights are vested in the Tribe. A 
members interest in that tribal property is personal and cannot be transferred or inherited. It is 
true that those 490 persons who were terminated under the UPA continue to have hunting and 
fishing rights it is not true that their heirs would continue to claim any interest in tribal property 
in their own right if they were not given the privileges of tribal membership. The rights of the 
terminated Utes to hunt and fish was not their personal property right and would be extinguished 
with their death and is not transferable or inheritable. The children of persons listed on the 
Termination Proclamation are not entitled through their parents to enjoy hunting and fishing 
privileges. There was a foot note I think from the Murdoch case, citing Judge Jenkins opinion in 
the Felter case, and I'm going to paraphrase that. In essence he said, those who are terminated 
Utes are readily identified and that their rights can be ascertained and that attrition would 
eventually extinguish the rights that they have because those rights are not inheritable or 
transferable and ultimately those rights would end. 
The Court finds that Mr Reber does not have, independent of the Termination Act, 
sufficient blood quantum to qualify for an Indian under the Rogers Test. I believe for purposes 
considering the Termination Act considering the Rogers Test he has no Indian blood. Mr. Reber 
does not and can not have any hunting or fishing rights that come through his mother, because 
they have been terminated and they are not transferable even though he was alive at the time of 
the Termination Act. Mr. Reber rights must be connected to the tribe who were the ones who 
had the hunting and fishing rights. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins the Court 
will not consider, for purpose of analysis, the Indian blood coming through their Maternal 
Grandmother. The same analysis will apply with respect to whether or not they receive any 
hunting or fishing rights from their Maternal Grandmother. Because the Court has found that no 
Defendant has sufficient blood quantum to satisfy the first prong of the Rodgers decision the 
Court need not inquire as to the second. 
All Motions with respect to claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction which are 
based upon claims that the defendants are Indians are denied. The Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the criminal cases which have been filed. 
Dated this ^H^day of ^ f / V t . 2004 yfoofN/^iutfy/vx* 
BY THE COURT: 
# / / % -I si W-l ny. 
A.l^fitf«F^copy ' 
Eighth District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I delivered by US Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Michael L. 
Humiston Attorney for Defendant, 23 West Center Street P.O. Box 486 Heber City, Utah 84032, 
on this /o'fe day of Jaftuaiy,'2004. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant 
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's pleading entitled "Witness Re: Reliance Upon 
Written Court Opinion, U.C.A. §76-2-304, as well as the pleadings relating to the Plaintiffs 
objection to the proposed witnesses. The Defendant alleges that he was acting in reliance upon 
a written interpretation of the law as contained in the following Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
cases: Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray Reservation v. Utah, 114 F. 3d 1513; and 
Timpanogos tribe v. Conway, 286 F. 3d 1195. To support his defense of ignorance or 
mistake of law, Defendant proposes to call the Appellate Court Judges who wrote the opinion 
of the Court in the above cases (to explain the case); a professor of law (to explain principles 
of Indian law); the Uintah County Recorder (to verify the location of the offense); the Chief 
Executive Officers of the "Timpanogos Tribe" (to explain the rights which the "Timpanogos 
Tribe" seeks to exercise in Timpanogos v. Conway); a senior member of the Uintah Band (to 
explain the history and traditions of Indians of Utah Territory and the history of litigation 
involving Indians of Utah Territory); and an "Indian of Utah Territory" (to explain Indian 
culture and religion and the government of the Uintah Band); an enrolled member of the 
Uncompahgre Band and former member of the Ute Tribe Business Committee (to explain the 
historical separate existence of Uintah Band, to explain the rights retained by the Uintah Band 
and explain all relevant written laws and resolutions); and, a retired law professor (to explain 
the archeological, ethnological, and linguistic evidence connecting the Uintah Bank with 
Shoshone Indians). 
Our Rules of Evidence indicate that "All relevant evidence is admissible . . . " Rule 402 
U.R.E. "Relevant evidence" is defined as evidence "having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E. Our statutes also 
provides (1) " In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the Court.. .(2) The jury 
- - - are bound to follow the law as stated by the Court" 77-17-10(c) U.C.A. Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure also mandates that the court instruct the jury in writing at 
the conclusion of the evidence. 
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The above witnesses are offered as witnesses concerning the Defendant's defense of 
Ignorance or mistake of law under U.C.A. 76-2-34 (2)(b). That section states: 
"(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no 
defense to a crime unless: . . . 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actions reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) The official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant 
of permission by an administrative agency changed by law with responsibility for interpreting 
the law in question; or of the law contained in an opinion of a Court of record or made by a 
public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a Court 
of record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question." 
Defendant has now abandoned his original claim that the permit he showed the officers 
at the scene (which was issued by the "Tmipanogos Tribe") was a valid license which allowed 
the permittee to hunt wildlife. He now claims that, although the permit was not valid, at the 
time, he reasonably believed that it was valid. Alternatively at various times, Defendant has 
indicated that he was entitled to hunt without a permit issued by the State either: 
(1) Because he is a descendant of a terminated Ute and has inherited hunting privileges 
from his mother; or 
(2) Because he was alive at the time that the Termination Proclamation was issued and 
was not listed on the proclamation; and therefore has maintained rights to hunt; or 
(3) Because he is an aboriginal Indian of Utah Territory who retains aboriginal hunting 
rights. 
In its prior order this Court has ruled that hunting and fishing rights can not be 
inlierited; that the Defendant's Indian status was terminated when his mother was listed on the 
Termination Proclamation; and, because he is 93.75% non-Indian, he does not possess a 
significant quantum of Indian blood and is not entitled to Indian status under U.S. v. Rogers, 
45 U.S. (4 How.) 567. It is therefore apparent to the Court that in order for the Defendant to 
raise the defense of mistake of law based upon the 10th Circuit opinions, he must introduce 
evidence that: 
(1) He actually read the opinions or was informed of the decisions in a manner which 
could support reasonable reliance (if indeed one can ever reasonably rely upon hearsay 
concerning the contents of an opinion); and 
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(2) The holding in at least one of the cases was either: 
(A) The "Timpanogos Tribe has legal authority to issue permits to take wildlife; 
or 
(B) Descendants of terminated Utes, inherit their terminated parents rights to 
hunt wildlife; or 
(C) Children of terminated Utes who were alive at the date of the Termination 
Proclamation, who were not listed on the proclamation, maintain rights to hunt; or 
(D) A person who is only 6.25% Indian has a significant quantum of Indian 
blood under Rogers; and, 
(3) He relied upon the holding in acting or failing to act; and 
(4) His reliance on the holding was reasonable. 
The Court has carefully read each of the cases relied upon by the Defendant. 
Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway decided two narrow procedural issues: (1) Whether the Federal 
District Court had jurisdiction to consider the "Timpanogos Tribe's" claims; and (2) Whether 
the State of Utah was entitled to a dismissal under 12(b)(6) (Federal rules of Civil Procedure) 
for failure to state a claim of action based upon immunity of the State under the Eleventh 
Amendment. The Court held that the fact that the "Timpanogos Tribe" was not recognized as 
an Indian Tribe by the Federal Government did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction; 
and that, because the Plaintiffs only requested prospective injunctive relief, the State was not 
entitled to a 12(b)(6) dismissal based upon immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah is an attempt by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
to resolve conflicts between its prior holding in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773F.2d 1087 and 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399. The case 
addresses the issues of the boundaries of the Uintah Valley Reservation in light of the 
foregoing decisions. No issue relative to this case was considered by the Court. 
For the purpose of considering the issue of the Defendant's Indian status, the State has 
indicated that it will concede that the offense occurred within Indian Country. Even assuming 
that the offense occurred within Indian Country, the Court has previously ruled that the 
Defendant does not have Indian status and that the Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, in order 
to advance its defense the Defendant must point to language in one of the cases which would 
reasonably lead the Defendant to believe one of the alternatives listed in (2) (A) through (D) 
above. 
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Neither of the cases which the Defendant relies upon held that: "The Timpanogos 
Tribe" has legal authority to issue hunting permits; or, children of terminated Utes inherit 
hunting rights; or, children of terminated Utes who were alive at the date of the Termination 
Proclamation retain hunting rights; or, a person who is 6.25% Indian has a significant 
quantum of Indian blood under U.S. v. Rogers. Therefore, the Defendant can not advance a 
defense of ignorance or mistake of law based upon either case. It would be unreasonable as a 
matter of law for the Defendant to read either or both of these cases and conclude that the 
"Timpanogos Tribe" had legal authority to issue a permit, or that he was entitled to hunt based 
upon any of the various theories which are based upon his claimed Indian Status, or that he 
had a right to hunt based upon a permit issued by the "Timpanogos Tribe". 
In addition, it is apparent that the proposed testimony is not relevant to the defense of 
ignorance or mistake of law and that some of the testimony is improperly offered to instruct 
the jury as to the law. The defense of ignorance or mistake of law requires reasonable reliance 
upon a written decision of a Court of record. The reliance can be based only on the written 
opinion- "The language of Section 76-2-304 clearly and unambiguously requires a written 
interpretation, by either a Court of Record or a public servant, in order for mistake of law to 
be an available defense." (State v. Norton, 67 P.3d 1050 at 1053). The opinions which the 
Defendant relies upon were opinions of a panel of Judges. Each opinion is what it is; the 
opinion of the panel can not be added to or subtracted from through parol evidence from one 
of its members. The law expressly requires that the reliance must be based on the opinion 
itself not some subsequent explanation of the opinion from a panel member. Similarly, it 
would be inappropriate to allow a professor of law to testify as to general principles of law 
upon which Indians routinely rely. The defense is specifically tied to written opinions issued 
by a Court of record, not general principles of law. The Defendant seeks to present evidence 
regarding: the purpose of the Timpanogos Tribe in bringing the lawsuit and the rights they 
seek to enforce; Indian history and tradition; Indian culture and religion; the separate existence 
of the Uintah Band and the rights of its members; the laws and resolutions of the Uintah Band; 
and the archeological, ethnological, and linguistic connection to the Shoshone Tribe; However, 
none of this testimony is relevant to the written opinion upon which Defendant relies. Neither 
is the testimony of Mr. Simmons concerning the location of the alleged crime. 
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Based upon the above, the Court finds that the proposed testimony is not relevant 
because it does not have any tendency to make it more probable or less probable that the 
Defendant relied upon either 10th Circuit case. The Court will also find as a matter of law that 
the Defendant could not reasonably rely upon either Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway or Ute 
Indian Tribe v. Utah to advance his defense of ignorance or mistake of law. 
DATED this }0 day of January, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNSTblSTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the Q? 1 day of January, 2004, true and correct copies of the 
Ruling and Order were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Edwin T. Peterson, 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr. Michael L. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE OJg'PttTCT OF UTAH 
DBHfN CLERK 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
AFFILIATED UTE CITIZENS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE 
UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
UTE DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, and 
CHARLES H. DENVER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE 
UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION, 
a federal corporation, LUKE 
J. DUNCAN, STEWART PIKE, GARY 
POOWEGUP, SR., FLOYD WOPSOCK, 
ALVIN PINNECOOSE, and CURTIS 
CESSPOOCH, in their official 
capacities as members of the 
Uintah and Ouray Tribal 
Business Committee, 
Defendants. 
GLEN MAC MURDOCK, JR., MAC 
EUGENE MURDOCK, and THE 
AFFILIATED UTE CITIZENS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Civil No. 85-C-569J 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Civil NO. 89-C-959W 
Civil NO. 89-C-982G 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE 
UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION, 
a federal corporation, LUKE 
J. tfUNCAN, STEWART PIKE, GARY 
POOWEGUP, SR., FLOYD WOPSOCK, 
ALVIN PINNECOOSE, and CURTIS 
CESSPOOCH, in their official 
capacities as members of the 
Business Committee of the 
Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Reservation, UTE DISTRIBUTION 
CORPORATION, MANUEL LUJAN, 
JR., SECRETARY OF THE UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OP THE 
INTERIOR, 
Defendants. 
On July 20, 1990, the above-captioned cases came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, the Honorable David 
K. Winder, and the Honorable J. Thomas Greene, sitting en banc. 
The court has considered the pleadings, affidavits, stipulations, 
arguments of counsel, and proposed orders in this case. Based upon 
this consideration and with good cause appearing therefore, the 
court hereby enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and preliminary injunction. 
DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of these findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and preliminary injunction, the court relies upon the following 
definitions: 
"Tribe" means the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation; 
"Mixed-blood" means any individual mixed-blood Ute listed upon 
the final mixed-blood roll (published in the Federal Register on 
April 5, 1956) and whose name was removed from the rolls of the Ute 
2 
Indian Tribe pursuant to the provisions of the Ute Termination Act; 
"Full-blood" means any individual enrolled as a member of the 
Tribe t 
"Non-Indian" means any individual who is neither a mixed-blood 
nor a full-blood; 
"Termination Act" means the Ute Termination Act of August 27, 
1954, ch. 1009, 68 Stat. 868, codified at 25 tJ.S.C. S§ 677-67?aa; 
"Tribal Lands" means tribal trust lands within the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mixed-bloods have a right to hunt and fish on tribal 
lands, and are entitled to exercise that right in the same fashion 
and with the same privileges as full-blood tribal members. 
2. The right of mixed-bloods to hunt and fish on tribal lands 
is an "asset not susceptible to equitable and practicable 
distribution" as that phrase is used in the Termination Act and 
matters related to it. 
3. The above-captioned lawsuits involve, among other things, 
the common issue of the hunting and fishing rights of mixed-bloods 
under the Termination Act. The court does not pass upon separate 
issues that may remain in any of the three cases. 
4. The Termination Act does not confer jurisdiction upon the 
tribal courts to clarify rights under the Termination Act, nor to 
enforce or determine the provisions and the consequences of the 
Termination Act. 
5. This court has subject matter jurisdiction over matters 
3 
concerning right* which are the subject of the Termination Act. 
6. This court has subject natter jurisdiction over natters 
concerning the interpretation and enforcement of provisions and the 
consequences of the Termination Act. 
7. The Tribe has used and is threatening the use of civil or 
criminal actions in tribal courts to prevent children of .tod-
blood, from accompanying their parents when the mixed-bloods 
exercise their right to hunt and fish on tribal lands. 
.. until recently, the Tribe has not attempted consistently 
to prevent mixed-bloods from hunting or fishing while in the 
company of their families. Counsel for the Tribe previously 
represented to the court during hearings in the above-captioned 
cases that the Tribe would not oppose this practice by mixed-
bloods* 
,. Section 1-4-2 of the Law and Order Code of the Ute Indian 
Tribe provides. "Relief in a civil contempt proceeding may be 
coercive or compensatory in nature as to the complaining party and 
»ay include a fine payable to the Court or to the complaining party 
or imprisonment of the party in contempt to secure compliance, or 
both," 
XO. section 1-4-3 of the Law and Order Code of the Ute Indian 
Tribe provides: "Criminal contempt is an offense which may be 
punishable, at the discretion of the Court based on the nature of 
the conduct in guestion, with a fine of up to SSOO.OO and/or up to 
six (6) months in jail." 
1 X. During the July 20, 1990 hearing, counsel for the .rob. 
informed this court that mixed-bloods who hunt or fish accompanied 
by non-Indians will be cited for civil contempt only and will be 
escorted off the reservation. 
12. Accordingly, the court finds that there would be a 
substantial risk of confrontation between mixed-bloods and full-
bloods unless a preliminary injunction is issued to maintain the 
historical status quo, 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
NOW IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, effective July 20, 1990, that 
defendant Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, its 
officers, and those acting for and on behalf of the Tribe in any 
capacity, be, and hereby are, restrained and preliminarily enjoined 
from; 
1. Interfering in any way with the exercise of hunting and 
fishing rights by mixed-bloods on tribal lands in the same fashion 
and on the same conditions as any full-blood tribal member; 
2. Interfering with any children of the mixed bloods who 
accompany their mixed-blood parents when the mixed«blood parents 
exercise the rights of hunting and fishing on tribal lands? and 
3. Interfering with the exercise of hunting and fishing 
rights of mixed-bloods on tribal lands by issuing citations to 
mixed-bloods or their children or by physically escorting them from 
tribal lands. 
NOW IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, effective July 20, 1990, that the 
mixed-blood Utes be, and hereby are, restrained and preliminary 
enjoined from: 
5 
4. Exercising rights beyond those exercised by full-bloods 
in reference to hunting and fishing on tribal lands. 
NOW IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, effective July 20, 1990, that any 
violation of this preliminary injunction be brought to the 
attention Of this court, en banc, by the filing of a petition with 
the court in writing and under oath. 
This order resolves only those questions common to the above-
captioned cases concerning the hunting and fishing rights of mixed-
bloods on tribal lands. This order does not treat or pass upon 
issues in any of the three cases which are separate from these 
common questions. 
Dated this & ^  day of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
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